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Trade wars between countries in the renewable energy sector have proliferated
in recent years, potentially hindering the growth of the industry. This dissertation
investigates the welfare effect of anti-dumping policies initiated by the US govern-
ment against Chinese manufacturers. It focuses on the US solar industry, which has
grown more than thirtyfold over the past ten years.
Chapter 1 describes the policy background leading to the trade war, together
with institutional details of the industry. Furthermore, it proposes a two-country
theoretical model to formalize how anti-dumping policies affect the market in equi-
librium.
Chapter 2 estimates a structural econometric model with a differentiated de-
mand system and marginal cost for solar manufacturing that incorporates the verti-
cal structure between upstream solar manufacturers and downstream solar installers.
The estimation results suggest large markups among solar manufacturers and in-
stallers.
Chapter 3 conducts policy simulations and shows the impact of trade war on
the US solar market. In particular, it considers different changes in anti-dumping
duty and subsidy rates, and evaluates the welfare effect among different market
participants. The results show the anti-dumping policy has decreased producer
surplus and consumer surplus by around $874 million (in 2015 US dollars) and has
increased the greenhouse gas emissions by 5.98 million tons for the period 2010 -
2015. The installation capacity of US solar market would have increased by 36.4%
if there had been no anti-dumping policies. Compared with the large decrease in
profits for Chinese solar manufacturers, US manufacturers benefit only slightly from
the US anti-dumping policy.
Chapter 4 further investigates the welfare effects of trade policies on the pop-
ulation of consumers, by using a random coefficient discrete choice model which
captures the heterogeneity in consumer tastes for differentiated products. It then
explores the welfare change among different groups of consumers. The results show
that consumers who are relatively less sensitive to solar panel price (i.e., consumers
who reside in areas with higher median income, a lower percentage of households
with children and a higher proportion of democratic supporters) would benefit the
most if there had been no anti-dumping duties.
Chapter 5 concludes and discusses the issue of trade protectionism occurred
in other industries.
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Chapter 1: Introduction of Solar Trade War
1.1 Motivation
The solar power sector has grown rapidly over the past 10 years. The capacity
of photovoltaic (PV) systems has soared 3300%, from 6,660 MW in 2006 to 229,300
MW in 2015 worldwide. Meanwhile, the average solar module price has plummeted
by 82.5% from $4/Watt in 2006 to around $0.7/Watt in 2015, a decrease believed
to be driven by improvement in technology and economies of scale (Barbose and
Darghouth, 2016). While the solar manufacturing sector has been historically dom-
inated by companies located in United States, Japan and Germany, Chinese firms
have gradually gained market share since 2010. For the period 2010 - 2015, six
Chinese companies have been listed in the top ten cell producers. Several factors
explain the market dominance of Chinese firms: cost advantage, generous subsidies
from the government, and preferential loans from banks.
In October 2011, several American manufacturers sued Chinese solar manu-
facturers for violating anti-dumping rules set by World Trade Organization (WTO).
Chinese solar manufacturers were accused to sell heavily subsidized solar panels on
the US market. In May 2012, the US Department of Commerce announced that
anti-dumping duties were set at 31% for Chinese solar manufacturers that chose to
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participate in the investigation; companies that chose not to participate were sub-
ject to a 250% tariff. In retaliation, China imposed tariffs on exports of polysilicon
products from United States. Although this trade war affected companies in both
countries, Chinese solar companies appeared to be particularly negatively impacted.
For example, Suntech Power, a Chinese firm that was once the largest solar manu-
facturer in the world, became insolvent after the US anti-dumping policy came into
effect, and it went bankrupt in February 2014.
The trade war in the solar industry has been widely discussed, but little is
know about its total economic cost. In this dissertation, I fill this gap and estimate
the incidence of US anti-dumping policy among different market participants. In
particular, I answer five related questions: (1) How much did US and Chinese firms
benefit or lose from this policy? (2) How much did US consumers lose? (3) Were
there heterogeneous welfare effects among different groups of consumers. (4) Did
US installers benefit or lose from this policy? (5) To what extent has this policy
impacted the expansion of the solar market in the US?
I first use a two-country theoretical model, and show three results regarding
the impact of anti-dumping policy on equilibrium prices, quantities, and producer
surplus. First, an anti-dumping policy will increase the price of the foreign firm;
the price of the domestic firm will increase or remain the same; and increase for the
latter firm will always be less than the former. Second, the demand for the foreign
solar panels will fall, and the demand for the domestic solar panels will increase
provided that it is elastic. Third, the foreign solar firm will lose profits, and the
domestic solar firm will gain positive profits provided that its solar panel is elastic.
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I then use a structural model to empirically test these predictions and quantify
the welfare effect of anti-dumping policies on different market participants. My data
come from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL)’s Tracking the Sun
report series. This dataset provides household-level information on almost all of
the solar PV installations in the US market for the period 2010 - 2015. I observe
when and where the household installed its residential solar PV system, the size, the
price, the brand of the solar panels used, and the name of the installer, among other
things. In addition, I observe key characteristics of each product, such as energy
conversion efficiency, technology type, and color of the frame. The estimation results
are intuitive: on the demand side, the households prefer solar panels with high
energy conversion efficiency, panels made of monocrystalline cells and panels with
silver frames. On the supply side, I model the vertical structure of the industry and
explicitly account for the strategic behaviors of domestic and foreign manufacturers,
and domestic installers. The solar manufacturers are assumed to set their prices
first and the installers follow. The margin calculated corresponds to pure double-
marginalization price-cost margin with linear oligopoly pricing at the manufacturer
and retail levels (Berto Villas-Boas, 2007). The estimation results on the supply
side suggest that marginal cost increases with manufacturing wage, lending interest
rate, energy conversion efficiency and labor cost in installation.
I simulate the estimated demand and supply models for six counterfactual
scenarios to explore how the anti-dumping duty and manufacturing subsidy rates
impact the US solar industry: In simulation I, I set the anti-dumping duty rates to
zero while the US and China’s subsidy rates remain unchanged; In simulation II, I
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set the anti-dumping duty rates to zero, while setting China’s subsidy rates to be
equal to that of US; In simulation III, I set the anti-dumping duty rates to zero,
while setting the US subsidy rates to be equal to that of China; In simulation IV, I
set the anti-dumping duty and China’s subsidy rates to zero, while US subsidy rates
remain unchanged; In simulation V, I set the anti-dumping duty and US subsidy
rates to zero, while China’s subsidy rates remain unchanged; In simulation VI, I set
the anti-dumping duty, US and China’s subsidy rates to zero.
The simulation results suggest that the anti-dumping duty has decreased pro-
ducer surplus and consumer surplus by $874 million (in 2015 US dollars) and has
increased the greenhouse gas emissions by 5.98 million tons for the period 2010 -
2015. The installation capacity of US solar market would have increased by 36.4%
if there had been no anti-dumping policies. Compared with the large decrease in
profits for Chinese solar manufacturers, US manufacturers benefit only slightly from
the US anti-dumping policy. A domestic country can attempt to mitigate the effect
of dumping from foreign firms by subsidizing domestic manufacturers. The simula-
tion results suggest that this approach might produce better outcome in terms of
promoting the development of the solar industry, but it is costly.
To capture the incidence of trade restrictions on different types of consumers,
I extend the model and use a random coefficient discrete choice model with het-
erogeneity in consumer tastes for solar panel prices, and explore the distribution of
welfare changes among different groups of consumers. I revisit the six counterfactual
simulations and the results suggest that consumers who are relatively less sensitive
to solar panel price (i.e., consumers residing in areas with higher median income, a
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lower percentage of households with children, and a higher proportion of democratic
supporters) would benefit the most if there had been no anti-dumping duties. In
other words, these groups of consumers have lost the most in welfare from the US
anti-dumping policy.
1.2 Literature Review
This dissertation contributes to the literature on trade wars, solar markets and
vertical relationship in industrial organization. I will mainly discuss the research on
trade wars and briefly go through the other two streams of literature hereinafter.
This dissertation contributes to the empirical understanding of the impacts of
trade wars, which have become increasingly common in recent years. Anti-dumping
duties are popular instruments of the trade policy which aims at protecting domestic
market. Before 1980 anti-dumping tariffs were primarily used by five major devel-
oped countries (Australia, Canada, EU, New Zealand and the US), but since 1980,
developing countries (i.e. India, Mexico, China) have started to retaliate and have
also adopted anti-dumping tariffs. This trend proliferated after the World Trade
Organization (WTO) has been established (Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2008). For
example, in the 1980s, the US took anti-dumping action against Japan on the im-
ports of semiconductors. Back then, Japanese firms were very successful in the
semiconductor industry and captured a large share in the US market (Irwin, 1996).
Also, in the late 1990s, the US steel industry initiated a new round of anti-dumping
action aimed at imported steel from Asian countries (Mastel, 1999). India and
5
China have initiated hundreds of anti-dumping investigations since they adopted
the anti-dumping law in 1985 and 1997, respectively.
Regarding to the economic effect of anti-dumping policies, Gallaway et al.
(1999) use a computable general equilibrium model to estimate that the overall
welfare cost of hundreds of active US anti-dumping and countervailing duty orders
in 1993 was $4 billion. Prusa (2001) documents two key costs of anti-dumping
protection: first, once an anti-dumping policy has been adopted, countries often
have a difficult time restraining its use; second, on average, anti-dumping duties
cause the value of imports to fall by 30 - 50 percent. Egger and Nelson (2011)
employ a trade model to evaluate the effect of anti-dumping policy on the trade
volume and social welfare over the period 1960 - 2001, and find that the impacts
have been negative, but quite modest.
The impact of the anti-dumping policy on the domestic industry may not be
uniform across all producers within an industry (Feinberg, 2013), and often differs
across different industries.
Cohen-Meidan (2013) reviews the effect of imposing anti-dumping duties on
Mexican and Japanese imports of gray Portland cement. The reaction to the duties
in the US Portland cement industry ranges from incomplete substitution with al-
ternative imports to no substitution and no change in the market shares of affected
foreign producers. He concludes that the impact of a trade policy can differ con-
siderably across regions, even within the same country and industry, as a result of
within country market segmentation.
Blonigen et al. (2013a) evaluate the role of anti-dumping protection in pre-
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venting exit. They find little evidence that anti-dumping policy has decreased exit
in the steel industry. The lack of evidence with regard to the impact of anti-dumping
and countervailing duties on exit may seem surprising, but is consistent with the
result in Feinberg and Hartigan (2007) and Blonigen et al. (2013b). The wave of
bankruptcies in the US steel industry in the early 2000s occurred despite relatively
high levels of anti-dumping protection.
Reynolds (2013) tests whether the anti-dumping petition process itself can
help domestic firms raise prices and analyze the impact of anti-dumping petitions on
competition levels in two industries, US semiconductor and tapered roller bearing
industries. He finds little evidence that either of these industries increases their
market power following the filing of petitions for trade relief, suggesting that the
widespread belief that anti-dumping leads to more market power may not always
hold.
Levinsohn (1995) studies the trade friction in the 1990s between United States
and Japan in the automobile parts market. In order to address the growing bilateral
trade deficit in auto parts, the US threatened tariffs on thirteen Japanese luxury
cars, but agreed to drop the threatened tariff later. By simulating the threatened
tariffs, he concludes that the tariffs would have resulted in drastically reduced sales
of the thirteen models, and Japanese profits in total would have fallen around 12.5
percent, while the European firms would have captured many of the lost Japanese
sales. The US firms would have been pretty much unaffected by the tariffs.
My dissertation extends the literature on trade wars by studying a fast-growing
green industry and focuses on the trade issues between United States and China,
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which are nowadays the world’s two largest economies.
Second, my dissertation contributes to the growing literature on the solar
power market. One stream of this literature has focused on evaluating the fac-
tors leading to the adoption of residential solar power. Chernyakhovskiy (2015),
Bollinger and Gillingham (2012), Burr (2012), and Gillingham and Tsvetanov (2014)
all examine the adoption of residential solar photovoltaic (PV) systems in the United
States. They show that the financial incentives, solar-specific mandates, and peer
effect as important drivers of solar capacity growth. The uncertainty of the future
government subsidy can also affect the household adoption of solar PV when they
consider the option value of their investment decision (Bauner and Crago, 2015). A
second stream of the literature focuses on the cost reduction of solar prices (Bollinger
and Gillingham, 2014; Reichelstein and Sahoo, 2015; Gillingham et al., 2015). They
find that learning-by-doing among the installers lowers the solar prices, primarily
the non-hardware costs of the solar PV installations. More recent work have shown
rising interests on the structural estimation of demand and supply in the solar PV
market. Gerarden (2017) finds that consumer subsidies can encourage firms to inno-
vate to reduce their costs over time and he quantifies these impacts by estimating a
dynamic structural model of competition among solar panel manufacturers. Dorsey
(2017) provides evidence that using online bidding platforms to increase seller’s
competition and expand buyers choice set can serve as an effective way to increase
adoption. My dissertation is different in that it uses a structural model of demand
and supply with vertical contracting to evaluate the anti-dumping policies in the
solar industry.
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Third, my dissertation contributes to the empirical literature on vertical re-
lationships. In the vertical contracting between manufacturers and retailers, the
wholesale price data is typically unavailable, which makes the retailers’ and man-
ufacturers’ marginal cost difficult to measure separately. Berto Villas-Boas (2007)
uses a linear pricing model and derives conditions under which data on the retail
price and quantities are sufficient to identify the vertical model of upstream manu-
facturer and downstream retailer oligopoly-pricing behavior. This type of model has
been widely used to examine the vertical structure in different industries, such as the
contract between smartphone firms and carriers in the smartphone market (Fan and
Yang, 2016), the codeshare contract between ticketing and operating carriers in the
airline market (Gayle, 2013), and the vertical relationship between manufacturers
and retailers in the bottled water market (Bonnet and Dubois, 2010). My disserta-
tion is the first to study vertical contracting between upstream manufacturers and
downstream installers in the solar sector.
1.3 The Solar Industry
This section describes the growth of the US solar market, the US and China’s
subsidy policies on the solar power and the anti-dumping policy initiated by the US
against Chinese manufacturers.
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1.3.1 The US Solar Market
Solar power has become an important source of renewable energy in the US.
According to the Solar Energy Industries Association, the total size of solar PV
installation across the US has reached 14.6 gigawatts in 2016. Solar power has
overtaken wind, hydro and natural gas to become the largest source of new electric-
ity capacity on US grid in 2016, based on estimates from US Energy Information
Administration 1. The National Solar Jobs Census reports that more people are
working in solar now than at oil rigs and in gas fields, and one of every 50 new jobs
in the US in 2016 is added by the solar industry 2. Solar has become one of the
fastest-growing sectors of the US economy.
California is the state with the most solar energy in the US and its installed
capacity in 2016 was 3.9 gigawatts, which is enough to provide electricity to millions
of homes. California benefits from high insolation, but has also enacted policies to
support solar, such as the Renewable Portfolio Standard which requires that 33% of
California’s electricity come from renewable resources by 2020. New Jersey is second
in the country in terms of solar usage. It has 1.5 gigawatts capacity of solar power
installed. Though not the sunniest place in United States, the Garden State’s solar
market has benefited by one of the most favorable net metering standards, allowing
customers of any size array to use net metering. The rest of the top 10 states in
solar installation capacity are Arizona, Massachusetts, New York, Nevada, Texas,
1Source: Ars Technica, https://arstechnica.com/science/2016/12/
solar-is-top-source-of-new-capacity-on-the-us-grid-in-2016/
2Source: National Solar Jobs Census 2016, The Solar Foundation, available
at:SolarJobsCensus.org
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Pennsylvania, Minnesota and Colorado (see Figure 1).
To make readers better understand the solar industry, I provide some technical
information about the photovoltaic (PV) systems. A solar PV system comprises the
solar array and the balance of system (BOS), which includes wiring, switches, a
mounting system, inverters, a battery bank and battery charger. The solar PV
system can be classified into three types: residential rooftop, commercial rooftop,
and ground-mount utility-scale systems. A typical residential system has a capacity
of 10 kilowatts, on average, and is mounted on a sloped roof, while a commercial
system may reach a megawatt-scale and a utility-scale system is usually equal to
or greater than 5 megawatts in size. There are mainly two types of solar panels,
which are the most important part of a PV system. Monocrystalline solar panels
are made from a single crystal and their color is dark black, while polycrystalline
solar panels are made of multiple crystals and their color is dark blue (see Figure 2).
Monocrystalline solar panels takes longer to be produced and they typically perform
better than polycrystalline solar panels.
One important feature about the solar industry is the continued decline of
solar panel prices. The price has dropped 82.5% during the period 2006 - 2015,
from $4/W to $0.7/W, and both the total installed price and non-module cost have
fallen to different extent (see Figure 3). The total installed price includes everything
needed to get a solar PV system: the modules (panels), the power electronics, the
mounting hardware, and the labor cost involved in the installation itself. The total
installed price keeps falling while the module (panel) cost has remained relatively
flat since 2012. This pattern is believed to be driven by the decline in the cost of
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inverters which convert DC to AC power, and also the decline in labor cost resulting
from learning-by-doing in the installation workers (Barbose and Darghouth, 2016).
1.3.2 Government Incentives in the US
The growth of the US solar sector has been helped with various subsidy pro-
grams offered by the state and federal governments.
The federal government’s first push for solar energy took place in the 1970s in
order to cope with the oil crisis. The Congress passed the Energy Tax Act of 1978,
as a result of which commercial investment tax credit and the residential energy
credit were created to provide financial incentives (with a maximum of $2000 or
$25003) to those who purchased solar properties.
The federal government’s second push for solar energy began in the early
2000s as a part of the energy strategy for the 21st century launched by the Bush
administration. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 created a 30% investment tax credit
(ITC) for solar PV installations, with a $2,000 limit for residential installations.
Subsequently the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 removed the
$2,000 limit and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 temporarily
converted the 30% tax to a cash grant (Bollinger and Gillingham, 2014).
The federal subsidy is believed to be an important factor leading to the recent
growth of the solar sector. In 2006, when the 30% tax credit was introduced, the
annual installation of residential solar PV system in the US was 2,573 units. Nine
3The residential energy credit is calculated at 30 percent of the first $2,000 spent on purchas-
ing solar products and 20 percent of the next $8,000 spent on purchasing solar products with a
maximum of $2,500.
12
years later, the annual installation has grown hundredfold, to about 246,554 units
(see Figure 4). Cumulative installation of solar PV system has reached to nearly
700,000 units with 4.36 gigawatts capacity in total by the end of 2015.
The financial subsidy for residential solar PV installations at the state level
varies considerably from place to place and the incentive generally falls into four cat-
egories: cash rebate, state tax credit, Solar Renewable Energy Certificates (SREC)
and Performance-based Incentives (PBI) 4.
Cash Rebate. The homeowner can receive a cash rebate from the state for
promoting the use of solar energy. This one-time rebate is provided on a $/kW
basis at the time the system is installed and only lasts for a limited time in the
state, and will end once a certain amount of installation is reached. For example, in
California, it is a one-time, lump-sum upfront payment, nominally $0 - $2.5 per watt
5. In Maryland, its Residential Clean Energy Grant Program pays $1000/project
for customers who install a residential solar PV system smaller than 20 kW6.
State Tax Credit. Some states offer additional tax credits for installing the
solar PV system, thus dropping the upfront cost of the installation, which is similar
to the federal ITCs.
SREC. Solar Renewable Energy Certificates are credits that the homeowner
can obtain by selling the solar electricity to the grid. Usually, the homeowner will be
paid several hundreds of dollars by the utility companies. SREC is slightly different
4See energysage.com for more details, https://www.energysage.com/solar/cost-benefit/
solar-incentives-and-rebates/
5Source: Go Solar California, http://www.gosolarcalifornia.ca.gov/csi/
6Source: Maryland Energy Administration, http://energy.maryland.gov/residential/
Pages/incentives/CleanEnergyGrants.aspx
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from net metering polices. The meter simply runs backwards when the solar PV
system produces more than what is needed and the homeowner can receive a credit
for the extra electricity sold back to the grid.
PBI. Performance-based incentives are per kilowatt-hour credits that are paid
based on the actual total energy produced by the solar system during a certain pe-
riod of time. Unlike SREC, PBI don’t have to be sold through a market, and
incentive rates are determined when the system is installed. PBI policy is effective
in stimulating the solar installers and homeowners to focus on appropriate instal-
lation and maintenance of their systems, since the payment is solely based on the
energy production. One example of PBI program is California Solar Initiative, where
incentives are paid monthly for five years based on the actual energy produced by
the household’s solar PV system.
In addition to subsidizing consumers in the solar PV installations, the US
government also subsidizes its solar manufacturers to promote the development of
its solar sector. There are generally three types of subsidies offered to the US solar
manufacturers.
(1) Advanced Energy Manufacturing Tax Credit. As a part of the Amer-
ican Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 (ARRA), the Department of Energy
and Department of Treasury jointly launched the Advanced Energy Manufacturing
Tax Credit program in January 2010 for the manufacturers of clean energy equip-
ment, including solar cells, wind turbines, electric cars, and geothermal heat pumps.
Solar manufacturers who build factories or upgrade equipment are eligible for these
tax credits which equal to 30% of the investment cost in their manufacturing facili-
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ties. Phase I of this program was awarded funds of $2.3 billion and phase II provided
$150 million of additional credits. In January 2010, President Obama announced
the list of one hundred eighty-three clean energy manufacturing projects in 43 states
that received the credits and four polysilicon manufacturing enterprises were on this
list 7.
(2) Business and Property Tax Credit. Some states provide heavy subsi-
dies in the form of business tax credit or property tax credit to attract investment
from solar manufacturers and expand local employment. For example, qualified
high-technology businesses (including solar manufacturing firms) in Michigan are
eligible for business tax credit “for a period of time not to exceed 7 years as deter-
mined by the Michigan economic growth authority, an amount not to exceed 200%
of the sum of the payroll and health care benefits of the qualified high-technology
business attributable to employees who perform qualified new jobs”8. In addition,
solar manufacturing firms which build their plants or facilities located in renaissance
zone 9 of Michigan state are exempt from property tax once approved by the state
and local governments.
(3) Subsidized Land. State may provide subsidized land and infrastructure
improvement to attract business to their areas. For example, in March 2007, the city
of Pocatello in the State of Idaho purchased 67.3 acres for $942,975 and leased the
property to polysilicon manufacturer Hoku, for building plants at an incredible low
7Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Pages/tg1848.aspx
8Source: MICHIGAN BUSINESS TAX ACT (EXCERPT) Act 36 of 2007, section 208.1431.
9Michigan Renaissance Zones are regions of the state designated as virtually tax free for any
business or resident presently in or moving into a zone for a period of up to 15 years
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price of $1 per year for 99 years 10. In 2008, the Montgomery County in the state of
Tennessee built a new four-lane county road specially for Hemlock Semiconductor,
a polysilicon manufacturer, in order to make more convenient access for vehicles
travelling between the Hemlock Semiconductor site and the interstate highway 11.
1.3.3 Government Incentives in China
China has been one of the world’s largest manufacturers of solar panels since
2008 and became the largest producer of photovoltaic power in 2015 when it sur-
passed Germany. In 2017, China became the first country to exceed 100 gigawatts
of cumulative installed PV capacity. The extremely rapid development of its solar
industry coincides with the government subsidies and support. China first launched
the solar strategy in 2001 when formulating its Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001 - 2005).
Back then, there was no domestic solar industry in China and the global solar
market was tiny. Later on, China implemented a series of policies to encourage
the development of renewable energy and its solar subsidies initially focused on the
manufacturing side, offering tax breaks, subsidized land, cash grants and preferential
lending (Ball et al., 2017).
Tax Breaks. Qualified Chinese solar producers are eligible for a credit of
50% of the value-added tax. These tax breaks were first implemented in 2013 for
two years, and then extended through 2018. Besides tax incentives on the central-
10Source: Idaho State Journa, https://idahostatejournal.com/
news/india-investors-purchase-hoku-plant-in-pocatello/article_
9c96530a-888b-5edb-a301-8ff2169fdca9.html
11Source: Hemlock Semiconductor Group, http://www.hscpoly.com/content/hsc_comp/
four-lane-road.aspx
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government level, local governments provide various reduction in both value-added
tax and income tax. For example, the municipal government of Wuxi, hometown to
Suntech Power, offers local tax reductions for solar manufacturers with large revenue
(Ball et al., 2017).
Subsidized Land. Some Chinese solar manufacturers have received free or
discounted land from local governments for their solar-manufacturing hubs, primar-
ily for the purpose of building factories. For example, LDK, a solar manufacturer
which built its factory in the city of Xinyu in the Jiangsu Province in 2015, report-
edly benefited from the provision of subsidized land from the municipal government
12.
Cash Grants. Chinese solar manufacturers have received cash grants from
their municipal and provincial governments as an incentive for the local development
of solar industry. For example, as reported by LDK in its financial filings, these
incentive in 2007 included $3.1 million in electric bill reduction and $3.5 million cash
grant from local government authority 13. In addition, some solar manufacturers may
receive a cash injection from their local governments when they experience financial
distress. The rationale behind these government rescue is that these companies are
large employers and taxpayers, thus important contributors to the local economy
(Ball et al., 2017). One of the prominent examples is Suntech Power. Suntech Power,
which was once the pioneer of Chinese solar manufacturers, defaulted on payment
of $541 million worth of bonds in March 2013. Suntech Power filed for bankruptcy
12Source: NBD article, http://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2012-06-22/662422.html
13Source: Form 20-F for LDK, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1385424/
000114554908000623/h02002e20vf.htm
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subsequently and was restructured in Apirl 2014. The Wuxi municipal government
supported Suntech Power in two ways: it provided a $150 million cash injection in
Suntech Power’s holding company and offered Suntech Power a five-year exemption
from revenue taxes after the restructuring 14.
Preferential Lending. Government-affiliated banks in China have pro-
vided preferential lending to finance solar manufacturers. China Development Bank
(CDB), controlled by the Chinese government, is the primary lender in financing
China-based solar companies. In 2010 alone, the CDB authorized an unprecedented
$30.41 billion line of credit to five top Chinese solar manufacturers: LDK Solar,
Suntech Power, Yingli, JA Solar, and Trina (Ball et al., 2017). Several loans offered
to solar manufacturers were very generous and may not have been offered by private
banks. A good example is the case of Yingli, one of China’s largest solar suppliers.
It has received $1.16 billion in new loans from CDB in the Spring of 2016 when it was
on the verge of insolvency 15. This debt helped Yingli repay its existing loans thus
avoiding a potential default, and supported Yingli to expand its production capac-
ity. The Export-Import Bank of China, one of the three Chinese policy banks, also
provides low-interest loans to foreign buyers of Chinese solar companies’ products.
The preferential rates offered by the banks act as implicit government subsidies.





In the context of international trade, dumping occurs when manufacturers
export products to another country at a price below the price charged in its home
market or below its cost of production (definition in the GATT/WTO). In October
2011, a coalition of solar manufacturers, led by SolarWorld, a German company with
considerable manufacturing in the United States, filed an anti-dumping petition
against solar products from China. They claimed that Chinese solar manufacturers
collected heavy subsidies from their government and dumped the solar cells and
panels into the American market. In November 2011, US Department of Commerce
initiated anti-dumping and countervailing duties 16 investigations of imports of solar
cells from China. The merchandise covered by these investigations consisted of
“crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, and modules, laminates, and panels, consisting
of crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, whether or not partially or fully assembled
into other products, including, but not limited to, modules, laminates, panels and
building integrated materials.”17
In October 2012, the Department of Commerce issued its affirmative final
determination and concluded that Chinese solar producers were benefiting from
unfair government subsidies and were selling solar cells in United States by dumping
margins ranging from 18.32% to 249.96%. The rates of anti-dumping duties faced
16Countervailing duties, also known as anti-subsidy duties, are trade import duties imposed
under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules to neutralize the negative effects of subsidies.
17See the detail in the fact sheet released by the International Trade Administration of the US De-
partment of Commerce: http://enforcement.trade.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet_
prc-solar-cells-ad-cvd-init.pdf
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by Chinese solar makers fell into four categories: 1) 31.73%, received by Suntech
Power, one of the largest solar manufacturers; 2) 18.32%, received by Trina Solar; 3)
25.96%, received by fifty-nine other exporters; 4) 249.96%, received by all remaining
Chinese exporters. In the countervailing duties investigation, Suntech Power and
Trina Solar received countervailing rates of 14.78% and 15.97%, respectively, while
all other Chinese producers received a rate of 15.24%.
However, this ruling only applied to panels made from Chinese solar cells.
A few Chinese companies were able to evade the duties by assembling panels from
cells produced elsewhere, for example in Taiwan Region, even though the production
materials (such as ingots and wafers) for those cells came from China.
To close this loophole, in January 2014, SolarWorld filed new anti-dumping
and anti-subsidy cases against China and Taiwan Region with the US Department of
Commerce and the US International Trade Commission. In December 2014, the De-
partment of Commerce announced the investigation result and imposed steep tariffs
on imports from China and Taiwan Region. Trina Solar and Renesola/Jinko received
anti-dumping duty rates of 26.71% and 78.42%, respectively and forty-three other
exporters qualified for a separate rate of 52.13%. All remaining Chinese producers
received an anti-dumping rate of 165.04%. In the countervailing duties investigation,
Trina Solar and Suntech Power received countervailing rate of 49.79%and 27.64%,
respectively. All other producers in China have been assigned a countervailing rate
of 38.72%.
In July 2012, in retaliation to the US policies, the Ministry of Commerce of the
People’s Republic of China began the anti-dumping and countervailing investigation
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on the solar-grade polysilicon exports from United States. In January 2014, the
Ministry of Commerce announced the final investigation result and imposed tariffs
on imported US polysilicon products. On average, the US polysilicon manufacturers
received anti-dumping and countervailing duty rates of 57% and 2.1%, respectively.
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1.4 Two-country Theoretical Model
In this section, I propose a two-country theoretical model to explore how the
prices, quantities and producer surplus will change in response to an anti-dumping
duty. Consider an economy with a duopolistic solar industry: a domestic firm and
a foreign firm. There are three types of players in this market: the upstream solar
manufacturers (domestic and foreign), the downstream domestic solar installers and
the consumers. The solar manufacturer produces solar panels and sells by wholesale
to the solar installers. The solar installers sell the panels to the consumers while
providing installation services. The home country imposes an anti-dumping duty
rate of τ on the imports.
I model this problem as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the foreign
and domestic solar manufacturer compete in a Bertrand game, and choose their
wholesale price Pf and Pd, respectively. In the second stage, the solar installers
choose the final price πf for an installed foreign solar panel and the final price πd
for an installed domestic solar panel.
18See the fact sheet released by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China:
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/e/201401/20140100466573.shtml
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1.4.1 Solar Manufacturers’ Subgame




(Pf − τPf − Cf )Df (Pf , Pd)−Gf (1.1)
Πd = max
Pd
(Pd − Cd)Dd(Pf , Pd)−Gd (1.2)
Where Cf and Gf represent the marginal and fixed cost for the foreign solar
manufacturer, respectively; Cd and Gd represent the marginal and fixed cost for the
domestic solar manufacturer, respectively. Pf and Pd are the wholesale prices for the
foreign and domestic solar panels, respectively; Df (Pf , Pd) and D
d(Pf , Pd) represent
the installers’ inverse demand for foreign and domestic solar panels, respectively.
The first order condition with respect to price for the domestic and foreign
solar manufacturer is given by, respectively
Πf1 = (1− τ)Df (Pf , Pd) + (Pf − τPf − Cf )D
f
1 (Pf , Pd) = 0 (1.3)
Πd2 = D
d(Pf , Pd) + (Pd − Cd)Dd2(Pf , Pd) = 0 (1.4)
For the second order condition to hold, we must have
Πf11 = (1− τ)D
f
1 (Pf , Pd) + (Pf − τPf − Cf )D
f




2(Pf , Pd) + (Pd − Cd)Dd22(Pf , Pd) ≤ 0 (1.6)
In a Bertrand competition, the slope of the firms’ response function is upward.
An increase in the product price of one firm will not reduce the marginal profitability
of the other firm, and vice versa. Hence, the cross-partial derivative is non-negative
and it yields
Πf12 = (1− τ)D
f
2 (Pf , Pd) + (Pf − τPf − Cf )D
f
12(Pf , Pd) ≥ 0 (1.7)
Πd21 = D
d
1(Pf , Pd) + (Pd − Cd)Dd21(Pf , Pd) ≥ 0 (1.8)
Totally differentiating equation (1.4) and rearranging the terms gives
[Dd1 + (Pd − Cd)Dd21]dPf + [2Dd2 + (Pd − Cd)Dd22]dPd = Dd2dCd (1.9)
Totally differentiating equation (1.3) and rearranging the terms gives
[2(1− τ)Df1 + ((1− τ)Pf − Cf )D
f
11]dPf + [(1− τ)D
f
2 + ((1− τ)Pf − Cf )D
f
12]dPd





























1.4.2 Solar Installers’ Subgame
The installers sell the solar panels to the consumers and provide installation
service for them. Let πf be the final price of an installed foreign solar panel and
πd be the final price of an installed domestic solar panel. Suppose installers have a
common per unit installation cost c, so the full marginal cost of installing a foreign
solar panel is c+Pf and the full marginal cost of installing a domestic solar panel is
c+Pd. Assuming perfect competition among the installers for the foreign panels
19,
we have πf = c+ Pf . Similarly, assuming perfect competition among the installers
for the domestic panels, we have πd = c + Pd. Let F
f (πf , πd) be the exogenous
final demand function for the foreign panels and F d(πf , πd) be the exogenous final
demand function for domestic panels. These demand functions reflect the fact that
the buyers regard them as imperfect substitutes. In order to install one unit of panel,
an installer must purchase one unit of panel from the manufacturer. Therefore, we
have the following four equations.
πf = c+ Pf (1.12)
πd = c+ Pd (1.13)
19My empirical part (Chapter 2) predicts positive profits for solar installers, which is not con-
sistent with my theory here. I will make two assumptions in my empirical part: installers cannot
install more than a fixed number of panels per day and differ in their constant cost of installation
per panel, then the marginal installer will make zero profits but those with lower costs will make
inframarginal rents.
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Df = F f (πf , πd) (1.14)
Dd = F d(πf , πd) (1.15)
Totally differentiating equations (1.14) and (1.15) yields
dDf = F f1 dπ
f + F f2 dπ
d = F f1 dPf + F
f
2 dPd (1.16)
dDd = F d1 dπ
f + F d2 dπ




In this section, I derive how the prices, quantities and welfare change with the
anti-dumping duty rate τ . I propose three corollaries regarding the anti-dumping
policy: (1) In response to the anti-dumping duties, foreign solar panel price will
increase, and domestic solar panel price will increase or remain the same. However,
the magnitude of price increase of foreign solar panels is always greater; (2) In
response to the anti-dumping duties, the demand for the foreign solar panels will
fall; on the other hand, the demand for the domestic solar panels will increase,
provided that domestic solar panel is elastic; (3) As a result of the anti-dumping
duties, the foreign solar producers will lose profits; by contrast, the domestic solar
producers will gain positive profits, provided that the domestic solar panel is elastic.
In the following, I give the proofs for each corollary.
Corollary I: In response to the anti-dumping duties, foreign solar panel price
will increase, and domestic solar panel price will increase or remain the same. The
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magnitude of price increase for foreign solar panels is greater.
Proof:
In equation (1.11), assuming Gf and Gd are constants, we have dGf = 0 and












[Df +Df1Pf ] (1.19)
Where ∆ = α11α22 − α12α21, α11 = Dd1 + (Pd − Cd)Dd21, α12 = 2Dd2 + (Pd −
Cd)D
d









The second order condition, i.e., inequalities (1.5) and (1.6), and cross-partial
condition, i.e., inequalities (1.7) and (1.8), indicate that, α21 ≤ 0, α12 < 0, α22 ≥ 0
and α11 ≥ 0. The assumption in the uniqueness condition (or stability condition)
states that
∣∣Πd22∣∣ > Πd21 and ∣∣∣Πf11∣∣∣ > Πf12. Thus, we can derive that |α12| > α11
and |α21| > α22 and finally ∆ < 0. Here, the uniqueness condition ensures that
the Bertrand reaction functions are well behaved and have slope less than one in
absolute value, therefore there exists unique Bertrand equilibria (Friedman (1977),





With the signs of α12, α11, ∆ and D
f + PfD
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= −α11 + α12
∆
[Df +Df1Pf ] > 0 (1.21)
Expression (1.20) indicates that in response to the anti-dumping duties τ ,
the foreign solar panel price will increase, while the domestic solar panel price will
increase or stay the same. Expression (1.21) indicates that the percentage increase
is greater for the foreign solar panel. Consider a special case in which the installer’s
demand for domestic solar panels, denoted by Dd(Pf , Pd), has the form





where δ measures the substitution effect from foreign solar products and θ is
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Corollary II: In response to the anti-dumping duties, the demand for the
foreign solar panels will fall; on the other hand, the demand for the domestic solar
panels will increase, provided that domestic solar panel is elastic.
Proof:
The change of foreign solar panel sales (denoted by D1) with respect to the










From the demand function F f (πf , πd) and F d(πf , πd), we have
F f1 < 0, F
f
2 > 0, F
d
1 > 0, F
d
2 < 0 (1.28)
The properties of function F determine the properties of function D, thus we
have
Df1 < 0, D
f
2 > 0, D
d
1 > 0, D
d
2 < 0 (1.29)
Given own effect is larger than cross effect, we have
− F f1 > F
f
2 , −F d2 > F d1 (1.30)
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The above result indicates that the anti-dumping duty will decrease the de-
mand for the foreign solar panels. This is very intuitive, since the anti-dumping
policy increases the price in foreign solar panels sold in the domestic market. In the
following, I will analyze how the demand for domestic solar panels will change.
The change of demand for domestic solar panels (denoted by Dd) with respect


































is ambiguous and depends on
the function form of Dd. Assuming the installer’s demand for domestic solar panels,
denoted by Dd(Pf , Pd), has the form





where δ measures the substitution effect from foreign solar products and θ is
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= (−θ − 1)δP 2δ−1f P
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d (1.35)
From equation (1.29), we have Dd1 > 0, therefore the substitution coefficient
δ > 0. From equation (1.20), we have
Df+Df1Pf
∆




> 0. It indicates that if the domestic solar panel is elastic, then the anti-
dumping duty (imposed on foreign solar panels) will increase the sales of domestic
solar panels. The more substitution between domestic and foreign solar panels, the
more sales domestic producers will gain from the anti-dumping policy.
Corollary III: As a result of the anti-dumping duties, the foreign solar pro-
ducers will lose profits; by contrast, the domestic solar producers will gain positive
profits, provided that the domestic solar panel is elastic.
Proof:
The change of foreign solar producer’s profit with respect to the anti-dumping










Once the tariff is imposed on the imported foreign solar panels, the foreign
solar producer will increase its sale price and it will share the tariff burden with the
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consumers provided that solar panel is not perfectly inelastic or elastic. In other
words, the price of foreign solar products will not increase more than τ , so we have
dPf
dτ






< 1 and dD
f
dτ
< 0, we have
dΠf
dτ
< 0. The result implies the foreign solar producer will lose profit if it faces an
anti-dumping duty rate τ .
In the following, I will analyze that how the anti-dumping policy will affect do-
mestic solar producers. The change of domestic solar producer’s profit with respect




















































DdDd1 + (Pd − Cd)[Dd21Dd −Dd1Dd2] + (Pd − Cd)2[Dd2Dd21 −Dd1Dd22]
}
(1.41)
From equation (1.4), we have





Plug equation (1.42) into the right hand side of equation (1.41) and we have















































Assuming the installer’s demand for domestic solar panels, denoted byDd(Pf , Pd),
has the form





Where δ measures the substitution effect between foreign and domestic solar prod-

























From equation (1.29), we have Dd1 > 0, therefore the substitution coefficient δ > 0.
From equation (1.20), we have
Df+Df1Pf
∆
> 0, hence when θ < −1, we will have
dΠd
dτ
> 0. It implies that if the domestic solar panel is elastic, then the profit for
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domestic solar producer will increase from the anti-dumping duty that is imposed
on foreign solar products. The parameter δ suggests that the higher substitution
effect between domestic and foreign solar panels, the more profit domestic producer
will make from the anti-dumping policy. From inequality (1.30), we have −θ > δ,
therefore 2(δ + θ) − 1 < 0, suggesting that the magnitude of profit increase in
domestic solar producer will decrease with the domestic solar prices. Overall, the
magnitude of profit change for domestic solar producer will depend on quantity
effect (P
2(δ+θ)−1
d ) and substitution effect (δ).
Since solar panel is not a necessity good, its price elasticity of demand should
be smaller than -1 (i.e., elastic demand). In summary, as shown by the comparative
analysis, in response to the anti-dumping duties, foreign solar producer will lose
profits as a result of increased price and decreased demand, while domestic solar
producer will gain profits as a result of increased (or unchanged) price and increased
demand. In the following chapter, I will proceed to the empirical analysis.
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Chapter 2: Econometric Model
I now outline a model of the solar industry where demand and supply are rep-
resented. The demand side is modeled within a discrete choice framework. Specifi-
cally, I use a mixed logit demand model, where for simplicity I ignore the timing of
the purchase decision. The supply side captures the vertical structure, in which the
upstream manufacturers determine the wholesale prices for the solar panels and the
downstream installers determine the retail price while providing installation service
for the consumers.
2.1 Consumer Demand for Solar Panels
The main purpose of the demand model is to capture the behavioral responses
to solar panel prices. A consumer can choose the solar installer as well as differ-
ent types of solar panel to install. I assume that a consumer’s choice is a solar
panel/installer combination, indexed by j. Since there are many solar installers
in my sample, to simplify the empirical process, I classify the installers into ten
groups, in which the first nine groups represent the top nine installers who have
significant market share across the sample and the tenth group represents the rest
of the installers (see Table 5).
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I use a mixed logit model to analyze consumer purchase decision. The mixed
logit model obviates the three limitations of standard logit by allowing for random
taste variation, unrestricted substitution patterns, and correlation in unobserved
factors over time (Train, 2009). The conditional indirect utility of consumer i in
MSA w from purchasing and installing j during year t is given by
Uijwt = Xjβi + αpjwt + λmr + ηt + ζjt + εijt (2.1)
where Xj is a vector of observed nonprice product characteristics (energy conversion
efficiency, a zero-one indicator that takes one if the panel is made of polycrystalline
cells, a zero-one indicator that takes one if the solar panel(module) has a black
frame); βi is a vector of consumer-specific marginal utilities (assumed random) as-
sociated with the different nonprice product characteristics in Xjt; pjwt is the con-
sumer purchase price for product j, which is calculated by subtracting government
subsidies from total installed price and divide by the size of the solar PV system; α
represents marginal disutility of price (assumed fixed across consumers); λmr is the
solar manufacturer and installer fixed effect, where m represents the solar manufac-
turer and r represents the solar installer; ηt is the year fixed effect; ζjt is the product
characteristics unobserved by the econometrician but observed by the consumers
and firms; error εijt is i.i.d and follows the type I extreme value distribution.
The consumer taste parameter for nonprice product characteristics is modeled
as
βi = β + Σvi (2.2)
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where vi is a random draw from a multivariate standard normal distribution
(i.e., vi ∼ N(0,1)), Σ is a diagonal scaling matrix. This specification allows the
individual taste parameter for nonprice characteristics varies across consumers. The
predicted market share of product j is given by





l=1 exp(δlwt + µilwt)
dF (ν) (2.3)
where δjwt = Xjtβ + αpjwt + λmr + ηt + ζjt is the mean utility across consumers
obtaining from purchasing and installing product j; µilwt is a consumer-specific
deviation from the mean utility level which associates with the consumer tastes for
different product characteristics. F (·) is the standard normal distribution function.
The trans-log version of the predicted market share of solar panel/installer
pair j in MSA w during year t is
ln sjwt − ln s0wt = Xjβi + αpjwt + λmr + ηt + ζjt (2.4)
where sjwt is the market share of the inside goods and s0wt is the market share of
the outside goods. The market share for the outside goods is usually defined as
one minus the shares of inside goods. I select 42 solar panel models which have
significant sales in United States as the inside goods. These 42 popular models
are manufactured by eight publicly listed solar companies, including five Chinese
manufacturers (Trina Solar, Suntech Power, Canadian Solar, Renesola and Yingli
Green Energy), two US manufacturers (SunPower and REC Solar), and one South
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Korean manufacturer (Hanwha Q CELLS). The names of the brands and the models
are listed in Table 3.
To include the no-purchase option into the choice set of the outside goods,
I need to define the market size on each MSA-year level accordingly. Assume the
number of single family homes in MSA w is Mw, then the observed market share of
product j is given by sjwt =
qjwt
Mw×V , where qjwt is the actual demand for product j
and V is the percentage of buildings which are solar-viable in that MSA area. The
parameter V reflects the fact that not all buildings are suitable for installing solar
PV systems.
The demand model has two potential limitations. First, I assume that the
model is static and the consumers are not forward looking. In the case of solar
panel whose price falls over time, a forward-looking consumer may anticipate the
price reduction and delay her purchase decision. Therefore, the static demand speci-
fication may underestimate the true price elasticity (Aguirregabiria and Nevo, 2013).
Second, the specification of static model also assumes that the consumers are off
the market after their initial purchase and installation of solar modules. This will
again underestimate the price elasticity by phasing out the change in the distri-
bution of consumers (Gowrisankaran and Rysman, 2012). However, as argued by
Gerarden (2017), there is a feature of the solar market that ameliorates the first
concern brought by the static model specification: continued price reductions in
the solar market were not fully anticipated, even by the government and industry
practitioners, hence the consumers may not anticipate the decline of solar prices.
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2.2 Supply Side
In this section, I derive a supply equation that approximates the solar manu-
facturer’ optimizing behavior in the vertical contracting with the solar installer. The
structural econometric model is inspired by Fan and Yang (2016) and Gayle (2013),
and the price-cost margins are derived in the spirit of Berto Villas-Boas (2007).
The supply side of the model can be described as a three-stage game. In the
first stage, the solar manufacturer chooses its products. In the second stage, it sets
the upstream price charged to the solar installers given the demand shock. In the
third stage, the solar installers choose the final price charged to the consumers.
To solve for this subgame perfect Nash equilibrium it is standard to use back-
ward induction, i.e., by solving the final subgame first. In the final stage of the
model, the solar installer chooses total installed price pjt after observing the set of
products available (denoted by Frt), the price paid to the solar manufacturers for
getting the solar panels (denoted by pmjt), and the given demand. The total installed
price pjt is a package price charged to the consumer, which includes the solar mod-
ule(panel) price and the price on the installation. Suppose the marginal cost for the
solar installer to complete an installation of product j is crjt per consumer. Then
the installer r’s profit for each unit of a product sold is pjt − pmjt − crjt.
The derivation for the price-cost margin follows the procedure in Berto Villas-






pjt − pmjt − crjt
]
Msjt(p) (2.5)
where M is the market size. Then the first order condition is given by
pt − pmt − crt = −(Tr ∗∆rt)−1st(p) (2.6)
where Tr is the installer’s ownership matrix with the general element Tr(k, j)
equal to one when both products k and j are sold by the same installer and zero




In the second stage, the solar manufacturer sets the upstream price that it
charges the installer given the observed demand. The solar manufacturer m’s profit-








where cmjt is the marginal cost of the solar manufacturer that produces the
product j. The first order condition is given by
pmt − cmt = −(Tm ∗∆mt)−1st(p) (2.8)
where Tm is the ownership matrix for the solar manufacturer, analogously
defined as the matrix Tr above. ∆mt is the solar maker’s response matrix, with
element (k, j) =
∂sjt
∂pmkt
, which represents the first order differentiation of the market
share of all products with respect to all upstream prices. In Appendix A, I discuss
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how ∆mt is computed.
Combining equations (2.6) and (2.8) yields the solar manufacturer and in-





t = pt + (Tr ∗∆rt)−1st(p) + (Tm ∗∆mt)−1st(p) (2.9)
Specifically, I assume the solar manufacturer’s marginal cost depends on a
vector of variables Xt and the solar installer’s marginal cost depends on a vector of
variables Yt. Then the joint marginal cost is
mct = γ1Xt + γ2Yt + κ+ εt (2.10)
where Xt includes wage rate in manufacturing, lending interest rate and the
panel’s energy conversion efficiency; Yt includes the wage rate in roofing; κ is
installer-year fixed effect. In my specification, I assume the manufacturer’s marginal
cost is determined by the labor cost, capital cost and the panel’s key product at-
tributes (i.e., energy conversion efficiency), and the installer’s marginal cost is de-
termined by the labor cost in installation. The fixed effect captures the time effect
and installer-level heterogeneity.
Combining equations (2.9) and (2.10) yields
pt + (Tr ∗∆rt)−1st(p) + (Tm ∗∆mt)−1st(p) = γ1Xt + γ2Yt + κ+ εt (2.11)
which I bring to the data for estimation.
40
However, some of the solar manufacturers have received government subsidies
in their production, thus lowering their products’ marginal cost. In this way, the
unadjusted marginal cost derived in equation (2.9) is overestimated. To address the
bias, I need to subtract the subsidy from the unadjusted marginal cost. Denote the







t (1− subt) + crt (2.12)
where subt is the subsidy rate on the solar manufacturers. Replace mct with
mc
′
t and rerun equation (2.10), the parameters on the supply side will be estimated.
The estimation procedure is summarized as follows: 1. run regression (2.11)
and get the estimated coefficients γ̂1, γ̂2, and κ̂; 2. calculate the fitted value of the
solar manufacturer’s marginal cost cmt ; 3. calculate the adjusted marginal cost mc
′
t
according to equation (2.12); 4. replace mct with mc
′
t and rerun regression (2.10).
2.3 Data and Identification
2.3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
For this study, I have compiled a new dataset on US solar market between 2010
and 2015 from various sources. The main dataset comes from Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory (LBNL)’s Tracking the Sun report series, which provide the
information on prices and quantities of solar PV installation. LBNL collects project-
level data on residential and commercial solar PV installations. The original sources
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of the data are from state agencies and utility companies that manage solar PV
incentive programs and solar energy credit registration systems. The dataset is
accessible publicly and can be downloaded from the National Renewable Energy
Laboratory’s Open PV Project data portal. This data file includes residential and
commercial solar PV systems, excluding utility-scale projects. As of the end of 2015,
the data file includes over 0.8 million observations of the solar PV installations and
has a rich set of observables. For each solar PV system recorded by this data file,
we can observe various information about this installation, including installation
date, system size, total installed price, sales tax cost, rebate or grant, zip code
or city, insolation rate, reported annaul PV generation, installer name, module
manufacturer name, module model, module technology, module efficiency, etc.
The other sources of data used in this dissertation are: (1) US Census Bureau,
which provides MSA-level demographic variables on the education, median income
and age across the US; (2) US Energy Information Administration, which provides
the state-level electricity prices information; (3) US Bureau of Labor Statistics,
which provides hourly wage in manufacturing across different counties and hourly
wage rate in roofing in the US; (4) World Bank, which provides information on
the lending interest rates across different countries; (5) Google Project Sunroof,
which estimates the technical solar potential of all buildings in a region based on
sunlight, installation size and space, and reports the percentage of buildings that
are solar-viable in the region.
The sample used in this dissertation is confined to the residential PV installa-
tion, which has a total number of 645,269 installations nationwide and nearly half
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of them happening in the state of California. Among different solar makers, Chi-
nese companies (including Suntech Power, Trina Solar, ET Solar and Yingli Green
Energy, etc) accounted for 25% of the market share in 2011 and accounted for 14%
of the market share in 2015 (see Table 1). More than 1,000 models of solar panels
produced by over 150 firms are observed in the dataset (see Table 2). The inside
goods I select consist of 42 models produced by eight solar manufacturers (see Sec-
tion 2.1 for more details), and the MSA markets selected in my sample accounts for
nearly 31% of the total markets in the US.
Table 4 reports the summary statistics for the key variables in my dissertation.
The average of the total installed price for one solar PV system is $5.12/W, with
a standard deviation of $1.65/W. The average government subsidy received by the
consumers is $0.82/W, which is nearly 16% of the total cost for a solar PV system.
The average energy conversion efficiency for solar panels is 0.17 with a standard
deviation of 0.02. Nearly 46% of the solar modules are made of polycrystalline pan-
els, and 20% of the solar modules have black frames. The average electricity price
on the state level is 16.11 cents/kWh with a standard deviation of 3.01 cents/kWh.
Across the MSA markets in my sample, on average, 30.23% people have a bachelor’s
degree or higher, and the average of the median income and median age are $78,280
and 38.78 years old, respectively. The average number of single family homes on
the MSA level is 868,000, and on average, for each MSA, nearly 72% of the build-
ings are solar-viable. The average manufacturing wage and lending interest rate
are $18.84/hour and 4.67%, respectively. The average wage rate in roofing across
different states in the US is $23.82/hour.
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2.3.2 Identification
In the demand side estimation, the purchase price pjwt is expected to be corre-
lated with unobserved product characteristics, leading to an endogeneity problem.
The other product characteristics are however assumed to be exogenous. The coef-
ficient on the price is identified using variation from instrumental variables (Berry,
1994). There are three candidates for the instruments that are plausibly uncorre-
lated with unobserved product characteristics: government subsidies, the so-called
BLP instruments, and the Hausman instrument.
Government Subsidies. Li (2016) uses government subsidies as instrumen-
tal variables for vehicle price to identify the demand parameter in the US electric
vehicle market, as they are uncorrelated with demand shocks. In my dissertation,
government subsidies offered to the households for solar PV installations vary by
state, year and panel model. A larger subsidy indicates lower purchase price faced
by the consumer. The government subsidies can be regarded as cost-shifters, as they
only affect the consumer demand for the solar panels through the purchase prices,
and they are uncorrelated with unobserved product characteristics.
BLP Instruments. A natural instrument for the price is to use a cost side
instrument, however, the cost variable is often not available (Berry et al., 1995).
The BLP instruments provide an alternative approach for variation in prices in
differentiated product settings that is based on a first order approximation of the
equilibrium pricing function (Gandhi and Houde, 2016). They are one series of
differentiation in attribute space and are constructed by adding up the values of
44
(i) characteristics of other products made by the same manufacturer, and (ii) the
characteristics of products made by other manufacturers. They are uncorrelated
with the demand shock given the assumption that the other product characteristics
arrive as part of an exogenous development process (Li, 2016). I construct BLP
instruments based on all three product characteristics, namely energy conversion
efficiency, technology type and frame color, and denote them by BLP efficiency,
BLP technology and BLP black, respectively.
Hausman Instrument. A particular type of proxy for cost-shifter is Haus-
man instrument (Hausman, 1996): the prices of product j in other market M
′
can
be used a a proxy for marginal cost of good j in market M . In my dissertation,
the Hausman instrument is the average installed price for the same type of solar
panel sold in other MSAs in the same year, denoted by Hausmanjwt. The iden-
tifying assumption for the Hausman instrument is that demand for a given type
of solar panel in MSA A is independent from the demand for the same type in
MSA B. The advantage of Hausman instrument stems from the fact that all the
instruments are contained in the price data. However, the underlying assumption
associated with Hausman instrument is sometimes too restrictive. Successful ap-
plications of Hausman instrument rely on the validity of two assumptions: (i) the
unobserved shocks to product costs affect all geographic markets, and (ii) there are
only geography-specific unobservable demand shocks and not nationwide demand
shocks (Megerdichian, 2010). The first assumption captures the relevance of the
instrument, and the second assumption validates the exogeneity of the Hausman
instrument. If there is a general shock throughout the nation, then the prices in
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areas other than C would be correlated with the error term in the demand func-
tion for area C, and so the Hausman instrument would not satisfy the exclusion
restriction. Criticisms of the Hausman instrument mainly focus on its exogeneity
assumption (Bresnahan and Gordon (1997), Nevo (2000) and Nevo (2001)). For
a nationally-branded differentiated product, including solar panels, national ad-
vertising campaigns can affect both demand and price, thus rendering Hausman
instrument invalid.
In order to select the appropriate instrumental variables from the three candi-
date sets described above, I use the two-stage least square (2SLS) method to estimate
a standard logit model which is more restrictive than the mixed logit model. The
specification for the standard logit model is in Appendix B. Table 6 reports the
results for the first-stage regression, in which price is regressed on different instru-
ments. Models 1 - 3 use each set of the instruments (subsidy, BLP instruments and
Hausman instrument), models 4 - 6 employ pairs of them, and model 7 applies all
three of them. The F-tests of the joint significance of the instruments in models
1 - 7 all yield values greater than 10. Model 1 has the largest (F-statistic = 383)
and Model 3 the smallest (F-statistic = 12.49). The results suggest that the instru-
ments do have explanatory power of variations in price. Then I move forward to
the second-stage estimates, in which Berry-type market shares (i.e., ln sjwt− ln s0wt)
are regressed on the instrumented price. The results in Table 7 suggest that, BLP
instruments lead to significant price coefficient (Model 2, 4, 5 and 7), while subsidy
and Hausman IVs result in smaller and insignificant price coefficient (Model 1, 3 and
6). This may be explained by the following reasons: state subsidies and nation-wide
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demand shock (such as national advertising campaigns) vary across years, thus they
don’t have much variation left once year-fixed effect has been controlled. Overall,
the BLP instruments perform well and are generally accepted in the literature. I will
use BLP instruments as instrumental variables in my model, and will also do two
robustness checks, each of which adds one more instrument (subsidy or Hausman
IV) to my main specification.
On the supply side, ψt captures the unobserved component of the marginal
cost, which influences the equilibrium price. Therefore, the cost vector Xt and Yt are
likely to be correlated with ψt in the supply equation. The instruments used in the
demand side are also valid for the supply side, because they will influence the size of
the markup of a solar manufacturer on each of its products, as well as the markup
of a solar installer. The BLP instruments are measures of the degree to which an
solar manufacturer’s product is close to its competitor’s product. Economic theory
suggests it will shift the equilibrium markup.
2.4 Estimation Result for Main Specification
The demand and supply parameters are estimated jointly by using General-




Table 8 reports the estimation results for the demand side in my main spec-
ification. The upper panel of demand side estimation reports the mean marginal
utility for each product characteristics (α and β), and the panel immediately below
this upper panel reports the variation in taste for nonprice characteristics (Σ). The
price coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The coeffi-
cient on “Efficiency” is positive and statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting
that consumers on average favor panels with higher energy conversion efficiency.
Energy conversion efficiency quantifies a solar panel’s ability to convert sunlight
into electricity. High efficiency indicates the panel can convert solar energy at a low
cost. The coefficient on “Technology” is negative and statistically significant at the
1% level, suggesting that consumers tend to choose panels made of monocrystalline
cells. Compared with polycrystalline panels, monocrystalline solar panels gener-
ally have higher efficiency rates, and they are also more space-efficient and have a
longer lifespan. The coefficient on “Black” is negative and statistically significant
at the 1% level, suggesting that consumers prefers solar panels with silver frames
rather than those with black frames. The taste variation parameters on “Efficiency”,
“Technology”, and “Black” are all statistically significant at the 1% level, suggest-
ing that consumers are heterogeneous, with respect to their tastes, for the nonprice
characteristics of the solar panels.
The demand parameter in Table 8 yields a mean own-price elasticity of demand
of -4.199, which is higher than the estimates (-1.76) in Gillingham and Tsvetanov
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(2014). This may be due to the fact that the choice sets defined in my model
are panel/installer combinations which provide more flexibility for the consumers’
choices. Table 13 reports the price elasticity of demand for the most popular mod-
els within each brand: Sunpower’s SPR-327, REC Solar’s REC260, Trina Solar’s
TSM-250PA, Canadian Solar’s CS6P-250P, Suntech Power’s STP185S, Hanwha Q
CELLS’s Q.PRO, Yingli Green’s YL250P, and Renesola’s JC250M. The own-price
elasticity of demand for models produced by Suntech Power is the highest(-4.724)
and the own-price elasticity for models produced by Hanwha Q CELLS is the lowest(-
2.932).
Table 9 and 10 present the results of the robustness checks for the demand side
estimation, in which the former uses the BLP instruments and government subsidies
as IVs and the latter uses the BLP instruments and Hausman instruments as IVs.
In Table 9, the estimated price coefficient is -0.626 and is statistically significant at
the 5% level. The signs of the estimated coefficients on the nonprice characteristics
are consistent with those in my main specification, but two of them (coefficients
on energy conversion efficiency and black dummy) are not statistically significant.
For the taste variation parameters, only parameter for technology dummy is sta-
tistically significant at the 1% level. In Table 10, the estimated price coefficient
is -0.777 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. The estimated coefficients
on nonprice characteristics are all statistically significant at conventional levels of
significance and their signs are consistent with those in my main specification. The
taste variation parameters are all statistically significant at the 1% level.
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2.4.2 Supply Parameters
Table 11 reports the firms’ markups and marginal cost. With vertical rela-
tionships between the upstream and downstream firms, the average markup for the
solar manufacturer and the solar installer is $1.038/W and $1.033/W, respectively.
The average margin for the solar manufacturer and the solar installer is 20.27% and
20.17%, respectively. Considering the government subsidy accounts for around 30%
of the total installed price for each residential solar PV installation, the price charged
by the solar manufacturers and installers seems reasonable. The joint marginal cost
amounts to $3.079/W on average.
Table 8 also reports the estimation result on the supply side in my main
specification. The coefficients on manufacturing wage and interest rate are both
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that joint marginal
cost increases with labor cost in manufacturing and capital cost, which are proxied by
hourly compensation cost in manufacturing and lending interest rate, respectively.
The significantly positive coefficients on energy conversion efficiency and installing
wage suggest that, joint marginal cost increases with the product’s energy conversion
efficiency and the labor cost in installation, in which the latter is proxied by the
hourly wage rate for the roofing. Table 9 and 10 provide robustness checks for the
supply side estimation. The coefficients on the cost variables have the same signs
as those in my main specification and are all statistically significant at conventional
levels of significance.
The above joint marginal cost is overestimated since it doesn’t subtract the
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subsidy the solar manufacturers have obtained from their governments. I use the pro-
cedure described in Section 2.2 to calculate the adjusted marginal cost and present
the estimation result for the cost parameters in Table 12. In the calculation process,
I assume only the US and China have offered subsidies to their solar manufacturers.
China offers various forms of subsidies to its solar manufacturers (see Section 1.3.3),
but the accurate calculation of the overall subsidy rate is a potential problem. For-
tunately, in the announcement issued by US Department of Commerce regarding to
the anti-dumping investigation against China in 2012, it listed the determined sub-
sidy rates received by all Chinese solar producers/exporters. For the brands in my
inside goods, the subsidy rates received by Suntech, Trina Solar and Renesola were
assessed to be 14.78%, 15.97% and 38.72% 1, respectively, and the subsidy rates
received by Canadian Solar and Yingli Green Energy were assessed to be 15.24%.
In the announcement issued by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Repub-
lic of China in 2014, it determined that the average subsidy rates received by the
US solar manufacturers were 2.1%, according to its results on anti-dumping and
countervailing investigation on imported US solar products.
1The subsidy rate received by Renesola was first determined in the announcement issued by US
Department of Commerce in 2014.
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Chapter 3: Policy Analysis of Trade Restrictions
In this chapter, I use the estimated structural model to study the market
outcome of trade-related policies. As shown in Chapter 1, subsidy policy on the
solar manufacturing and anti-dumping policy are the two important factors that
may have influenced the development of the solar industry. Moreover, countries may
respond in subsidy rates when facing dumping from foreign companies by increasing
the subsidy rates for their domestic firms. This motivates the various counterfactual
scenarios that I consider.
I conduct six counterfactual simulations based on different anti-dumping duty
and subsidy rates : In simulation I, I set the anti-dumping duty rates to zero while
the US and China’s subsidy rates remain unchanged; In simulation II, I set the
anti-dumping duty rates to zero, while setting China’s subsidy rates to be equal
to that of US; In simulation III, I set the anti-dumping duty rates to zero, while
setting the US subsidy rates to be equal to that of China; In simulation IV, I set
the anti-dumping duty and China’s subsidy rates to zero, while US subsidy rates
remain unchanged; In simulation V, I set the anti-dumping duty and US subsidy
rates to zero, while China’s subsidy rates remain unchanged; In simulation VI, I set
the anti-dumping duty, US and China’s subsidy rates to zero.
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In each counterfactual scenario, I compute the simulated equilibrium price and
demand, and then compare the outcome with the simulated outcome in the baseline
scenario. The baseline scenario refers to the situation when there is an anti-dumping
policy. Figure 5 reports the comparison of the simulated equilibrium price between
counterfactual and baseline scenarios. For example, in simulation I, on average, the
prices for Chinese solar products will decrease by around 10% and the prices for
US solar products will not change much, when I set the anti-dumping duty rates to
zero.
Following Small and Rosen (1981), I use the compensating variation to calcu-
late the change in consumer surplus in any counterfactual scenario, given by














where α is the consumer marginal disutility of price, W 0j and W
1
j are the
expected maximum utility for the consumers in baseline and simulated scenario,
respectively.
Before proceeding further, I discuss three important components in perform-
ing the welfare calculation. First, the anti-dumping and countervailing duty rates
imposed on Chinese solar products. Table 14 reports the anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duty rates imposed on the imported Chinese solar products. As I mentioned
in Section 2.4, different Chinese manufacturers may face different anti-dumping and
countervailing duty rates, and these duty rates that have been implemented since
2014 are higher than that in 2012. As shown in Table 14, Chinese solar manufac-
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turer Renesola was not subject to the anti-dumping and countervailing duty rates
in 2012. This was because the anti-dumping policy which came out in 2012 only
applied to China-made cells and modules assembled with such cells, but it didn’t
apply to the firms (such as Renesola) whose solar products were assembled from
cells manufactured elsewhere. To close the loophole that let the Chinese solar man-
ufacturers sidestep the duties, the US Department of Commerce amended its ruling
in 2014 and set steeper tariff since then.
Second, the proportion of module price and non-module cost in a typical resi-
dential solar panel installation in the US. The anti-dumping and countervailing duty
rates are imposed on the solar panels(modules), however, in my dataset, the price
for the solar panel is not observable and only the total installed price is available.
To resolve this problem, I obtain the price for solar module from total installed
price. The total installed price includes module price and non-module cost, with
the latter involving labor, overhead and marketing costs (Bollinger and Gillingham,
2014). Table 15 reports the breakdown of total installed price. In 2010, the module
price accounted for nearly 30% of the total cost, and in 2015 this ratio decreased to
around 20%. Based on the proportion of module price in the total installed price
as listed in Table 15, I can approximate the panel(module) price from the total
installed price.
Lastly, the environmental benefits that arise from solar PV installation. There
are two categories of avoided pollution from installing solar PV systems: carbon
dioxide emission and local air pollutants. The amount of pollution that can be
avoided is dependent on the type of electric power generation displaced by solar
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PV systems 25 years from now on. Following Gillingham and Tsvetanov (2014)’s
approach, I set 25 years as the time limit for estimating environmental benefit
and employ damage estimates of air pollutants from natural gas fired generation.
These are based on the fact that most manufacturers provide a 25-year warranty
on their solar panels and natural gas accounts for a significantly large fraction of
the electricity generation in the US. Other parameters involved include the average
carbon dioxide emission rate across the US, the toal external costs from natural gas-
fired generation in the US, and social cost of carbon. The average carbon dioxide
emission rate across all regions and hours of the day is estimated to be 1.21 pounds
of CO2 per kilowatt hour, i.e., 0.000605 tCO2/kWh. (Zivin et al., 2014). The
total external cost from natural gas-fired generation is estimated to be 0.021/kWh
(Muller et al., 2011). For the social cost of carbon, I apply the result $37/tCO2
from IAWG (2013) which is widely used by the US government.
Based on the parameters estimated by the main specification of my structural
model, I calculate the simulated results for the six counterfactual scenarios and
report them below. I also conduct simulations based on alternative models using two
other sets of IVs(i.e., BLP instruments and government subsidies, BLP instruments
and Hausman instrument), and put their results in Appendix D.
3.1 Simulation I: Removing Anti-dumping Duties
In this section, I evaluate the effect of removing the anti-dumping duties while
keeping the US and China’s subsidy rates on their solar manufacturing unchanged.
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As shown by the two-country model, removing the anti-dumping policy will drive
down the price of imported Chinese products and stimulate their sales.
Table 17 presents the change in demand for solar panels in the simulated
scenario I, when the anti-dumping duty rates levied on imported Chinese solar
products are set to be zero but US and China’s subsidy rates remain unchanged.
Simulating the purchase price, the percentage increase in product sales from Chinese
solar manufacturers (Canadian Solar, Renesola, Suntech Power, Trina Solar and
Yingli Green Energy) would range from 22.7% to 107.3% for the period 2010 -
2015, while the percentage decrease in sales from US solar manufacturers (REC
Solar and SunPower) would range from -0.04% to -0.4%. The overall sales of solar
panels in the MSA markets of my sample would increase by 83,951 kW, or 36.4%
compared with the baseline scenario when the anti-dumping policy is in place. This
simulated result is consistent with my comparative static analysis in Chapter 1, in
which I show that a fall in the anti-dumping duty rate will increase the demand for
imported solar product and decrease the demand for domestic solar products. Since
the MSA markets selected in my sample account for 31% of the total markets in the
US, the simulated sales across the US would increase by 270,810 kW.
The anti-dumping policy initiated by the US changes the competition among
Chinese and US solar manufacturers. Removing the anti-dumping duties would
decrease the imported Chinese solar panel prices and may make more consumers
switch to US solar products. The simulation results in Table 18 show the social wel-
fare change incurred for different market participants and the environmental benefit
implied if the anti-dumping policy had been removed. Over the period 2010 - 2015,
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for MSA markets in my sample, the net gain for US consumers, US manufacturers,
Chinese manufacturers and US installers would be 84.56, -0.22, 94.17 and 92.49 mil-
lion dollars, respectively. If I scale the results to all MSA markets across the US,
the net gain for US consumers, US manufacturers, Chinese manufacturers and US
installers would be 272.77, -0.72, 303.77 and 298.37 million dollars, respectively.
The anti-dumping duties seem to have a relatively small effect on the domes-
tic manufacturers’ profits. This can be explained by the fact that the substitution
effect between US and Chinese solar products is quite small. From equation (1.49),
in response to the anti-dumping duties, the domestic producer’s profit will depend
on the quantity effect and the substitution effect. In my simulation on the equi-
librium price, the solar panel price for domestic producers have not changed much.
This is possible in theory, referring to the special case in Corollary I when the de-
mand function for domestic solar panel is in the form of Cobb-Douglas. Therefore,
the domestic producer’s profit will mainly depend on the substitution effect. The
small impact of the anti-dumping duties on the US manufacturers’ profit may be
attributable to the small substitution between US and Chinese solar products. If
the anti-dumping policy is in place, the consumers may switch to solar products pro-
duced by other countries, for example, the European and Japanese solar products.
These products may have captured many of the lost Chinese sales.
Without anti-dumping duties, the US solar market would expand by 36.4%,
and the increase in solar PV installations would result in greater environmental
benefit in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and local air pollutants. The
simulation results in Table 18 suggest that, the greenhouse gas emission would be
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reduced by 1.85 million tons and the economic cost of air pollution resulted from
natural gas-fired generation would be reduced by 30.73 million dollars, together
amounting to total environmental benefit of 63.49 million dollars. If I scale the
results to all MSA markets across the US, the reduced greenhouse gas emission
would reach 5.98 million tons and the total environmental benefit would be worth
204.82 million dollars.
3.2 Simulation II: Reducing Subsidy Rates
In this section, I examine the market outcome when the anti-dumping duty
rates are set to zero and China matches its subsidy rates on solar manufacturing with
that of United States. Subsidy policy provides an alternative tool to anti-dumping
issues. A country which has been sued for dumping can respond by reducing subsidy
rates on domestic firms as a settlement with the dumping allegation, thus avoiding
anti-dumping duties.
Table 19 presents the change in demand for solar panels in the simulated
scenario II. Assume the countervailing duty rates (see Table 14) calculated by the
US Department of Commerce are reasonable, and I use the averages (28.31%) as
a proxy for China’s average subsidy rates on its domestic solar manufacturers. As
described in Section 1.3.4 and Section 2.4.2, the average subsidy rates of United
States on its domestic solar manufacturers is 2.1%. If China’s subsidy rates were set
to be equal to that of US, then the average price of imported Chinese solar products
would be presumably higher.
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Simulating the consumer purchase price, I find that the percentage increase in
sales from Chinese manufacturers (Canadian Solar, Renesola, Suntech Power, Trina
Solar, Yingli Green Energy) would range from 5.5% to 58.7%. The percentage
decrease in sales from US manufacturers (REC Solar and SunPower) would range
from -0.02% to -0.1%. The overall sales of solar panels in the MSA markets of my
sample would increase by 39,355 kW, or 17.1% compared with the baseline scenario
when the anti-dumping policy is in place. Since the MSA markets selected in my
sample account for 31% of the total markets in the US, the simulated sales across
the US would increase by 126,950 kW.
The relative decrease in subsidy rates from China will change the competition
among Chinese and US solar manufacturers. The resulted price increase in the im-
ported Chinese solar products may make more consumers switch to US products.
The simulation results in Table 20 show the social welfare change incurred for differ-
ent market participants and the environmental benefit implied in this counterfactual
simulation. Over the period 2010 - 2015, for MSA markets in my sample, the wel-
fare change for US consumers, US manufacturers, Chinese manufacturers and US
installer would be 40.18, -0.09, 43.39 and 42.70 million dollars, respectively. If I scale
the results to all MSA markets across the US, the net gain/loss for US consumers,
US manufacturers, Chinese manufacturers and US installers would be 129.62, -0.29,
139.96 and 137.75 million dollars, respectively.
Generous government subsidy is believed to be the key factor that has enabled
Chinese solar manufacturers to rapidly gain market shares in the US. If China were
to respond by reducing its subsidy rates offered to solar manufacturers and setting it
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equal to the rate offered in the US, the solar market in United States would expand
by 17.1%. This result can be separated into two parts: first, China would avoid
the anti-dumping policy by matching the subsidy rates, thus the US market would
achieve a 36.4% growth in the installed solar capacity, compared with the baseline
scenario (as shown in Simulation I); second, reducing subsidy rates on Chinese firms
would drive up the price of Chinese solar products, thus slowing down the expansion
of US solar market by 19.3% (36.4% - 17.1%).
The environmental benefit from reducing greenhouse gas emissions and local
air pollutants also seems quite significant. The simulation results in Table 20 suggest
that, the greenhouse gas emissions would be reduced by 0.87 million tons and the
economic cost of air pollution resulted from natural gas-fired generation would be
reduced by 14.41 million dollars, together amounting to total environmental benefit
of 29.76 million dollars. If I scale the results to all MSA markets across the US,
the reduced greenhouse gas emissions would reach 2.80 million tons and the total
environmental benefit would be worth 96.01 million dollars.
3.3 Simulation III: Increasing Subsidy Rates
In this section, I explore the simulated market outcome when the anti-dumping
duty rates are set to zero and US matches its subsidy rates on solar manufacturing
with that of China. The logic behind this counterfactual scenario is that import
country may respond by increasing subsidy rates on domestic firms when facing
dumping from foreign firms.
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Table 21 presents the change in demand for solar panels in the simulated
scenario III. The US subsidy rates on solar manufacturing are assumed to be 2.1%
on average and the average subsidy rates received by Chinese solar manufacturers are
28.31%. If the US matches its subsidy rates with that of China, the domestic solar
panel prices are expected to fall significantly. Simulating the consumer purchase
price, the percentage increase in sales from Chinese solar manufacturers (Canadian
Solar, Renesola, Suntech Power, Trina Solar and Yingli Green Energy) would range
from 22.7% to 78.1% over 2010 - 2015, while the percentage increase in sales from
US solar manufacturers (REC Solar and SunPower) would range from 16.5% to
21.0%. The overall sales of solar panels across the MSA markets in my sample
would increase by 110,522 kW, or 48.0% compared with the baseline scenario when
the anti-dumping policy is in place. Since the MSA markets selected in my sample
account for 31% of the total markets in United States, the simulated sales across
the United States would increase by 356,521 kW.
The increase in US subsidy rates on solar manufacturing changes the com-
petition among Chinese and US solar manufacturers. The drop in the prices of
domestic solar panels induces consumers to buy more US solar products. The sim-
ulation results in Table 22 show the social welfare change incurred for different
market participants and estimate the environmental benefit implied in this policy
experiment. Over the period 2010 - 2015, for MSA markets in my sample, the net
gain for US consumers, US manufacturers, Chinese manufacturers and US installers
would be 109.47, 29.00, 94.07 and 120.91 million dollars, respectively. If I scale the
results to all MSA markets across the US, the net gain for US consumers, US man-
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ufacturers, Chinese manufacturers and US installers would be 353.13, 93.55, 303.45
and 390.02 million dollars, respectively.
In this counterfactual scenario, the installation capacity in the US solar market
would expand by 48.0%. This result can be separated into two parts: first, by
matching the subsidy rates with that of China rather than employing the anti-
dumping policy, the US would achieve 36.4% growth in installed solar capacity,
compared with the baseline scenario (as shown in Simulation I); second, increasing
subsidy rates on domestic firms would decrease the price of US solar panels and
further expand the solar market by 11.6% (48.0% - 36.4%). However, this subsidy
policy would involve a significant cost. Over the period 2010 - 2015, for all MSA
markets across the US, the cost for the subsidy policy would be 218.47 million
dollars, while the producer surplus for US manufacturers would increase by 94.27
million dollars and US consumer surplus would increase by 80.36 million dollars,
compared with the baseline scenario 1.
The increase in solar PV installations would result in greater environmental
benefit in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and local air pollutants. The
simulation results in Table 22 show that, the greenhouse gas emissions would be
reduced by 2.44 million tons and the economic cost of air pollution resulted from
natural gas-fired generation would be reduced by 40.46 million dollars, together
amounting to total environmental benefit of 83.59 million dollars. If I scale the
results to all MSA markets across the US, the reduced greenhouse gas emissions
would reach 7.87 million tons and the total environmental benefit would be worth
194.27 = 93.55 - (-0.72), and 80.36 = 353.13 - 272.77
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269.64 million dollars.
3.4 Simulation IV: Zero Subsidy Rates in China
In this section, I study the simulated market outcome when the anti-dumping
duty rates and China’s subsidy rates are set to zero, while the US subsidy rates
remain unchanged. The logic behind this is that, countries may choose to eliminate
subsidy rates on domestic firms when facing anti-dumping allegation, thus avoiding
the incidence of anti-dumping duties.
Table 23 presents the change in demand for solar panels in the simulated
scenario IV. Simulating consumer purchase price, the percentage increase in sales
from Chinese solar manufacturers (Canadian Solar, Renesola, Suntech Power, Trina
Solar and Yingli Green Energy) would range from 4.1% to 55.9% over 2010 - 2015,
while percentage decrease in sales from US solar manufacturers (REC Solar and
SunPower) would range from -0.02% to -0.1%. The overall sales of solar panels across
the MSA markets in my sample would increase by 36,869 kW, or 16.0% compared
with the baseline scenario when the anti-dumping policy is in place. Since the MSA
markets selected in my sample account for 31% of the total markets in the US, the
simulated sales across the US would increase by 118,933 kW.
The simulation results in Table 24 report the social welfare change incurred for
different market participants and the environmental benefit implied in this policy
experiment. Over the period 2010 - 2015, for MSA markets in my sample, the net
gain for US consumers, US manufacturers, Chinese manufacturers and US installers
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would be 37.58, -0.08, 40.63 and 39.99 million dollars, respectively. If I scale the
results to all MSA markets across the US, the net gains for US consumers, US
manufacturers, Chinese manufacturers and US installers would be 121.23, -0.27,
131.07 and 129.01 million dollars, respectively.
By removing the anti-dumping duties and Chinese subsidy rates, the US solar
market would expand by 16.0%, and the increase in solar PV installations would
result in greater environmental benefit in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions and local air pollutants. The simulation results in Table 24 suggest that, the
greenhouse gas emissions would be reduced by 0.81 million tons and the economic
cost of air pollution resulted from natural gas-fired generation would be reduced
by 13.50 million dollars, together amounting to total environmental benefit of 27.89
million dollars. If I scale the results to all MSA markets across the US, the reduced
greenhouse gas emissions would reach 2.63 million tons and the total environmental
benefit would be worth 89.95 million dollars.
3.5 Simulation V: Zero Subsidy Rates in the US
In this section, I study the simulated market outcome when the anti-dumping
duty rates and US subsidy rates are set to zero but China’s subsidy rates remain
unchanged. Table 25 presents the change in demand for solar panels in the simulated
scenario V. Simulating the consumer purchase price, the percentage increase in sales
from Chinese solar manufacturers (Canadian Solar, Renesola, Suntech Power, Trina
Solar and Yingli Green Energy) would range from 22.7% to 107.3% over 2010 -
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2015, while the sales from US solar manufacturers (REC Solar and SunPower) would
decrease by around 1.7%. The overall sales of solar panels across the MSA markets
in my sample would increase by 81,931 kW, or 35.6% compared with the baseline
scenario when the anti-dumping policy is in place. Since the MSA markets selected
in my sample account for 31% of the total markets in the US, the simulated sales
across the US would increase by 264,294 kW.
The simulation results in Table 26 report the social welfare change incurred for
different market participants and the environmental benefit implied in this policy
experiment. Over the period 2010 - 2015, for MSA markets in my sample, the net
gains for US consumers, US manufacturers, Chinese manufacturers and US installers
would be 82.66, -2.43, 94.18 and 90.34 million dollars, respectively. If I scale the
results to all MSA markets across the US, the net gains for US consumers, US
manufacturers, Chinese manufacturers and US installers would be 266.65, -7.84,
303.79 and 291.42 million dollars, respectively.
By removing the anti-dumping duties and US subsidy rates, the installation
capacity in US solar market would expand by 35.6%. The increase in solar PV instal-
lations would result in greater environmental benefit in terms of reducing greenhouse
gas emission and local air pollutants. The simulation results in Table 26 suggest
that, the greenhouse gas emissions would be reduced by 1.81 million tons and the
economic cost of air pollution resulted from natural gas-fired generation would be
reduced by 29.99 million dollars, together amounting to total environmental benefit
worth of 61.97 million dollars. If I scale the results to all MSA market across the
US, the reduced greenhouse gas emissions would reach 5.84 million tons and the
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total environment benefit would be worth 199.89 million dollars.
3.6 Simulation VI: Zero Subsidy Rates in China and the US
In this section, I evaluate the market outcome when the anti-dumping duty
rates, US and China’s subsidy rates are all set to zero. Table 27 presents the
change in demand for solar panels in the simulated scenario VI. Simulating consumer
purchase price, the percentage increase in sales from Chinese solar manufacturers
(Canadian Solar, Renesola, Suntech Power, Trina Solar and Yingli Green Energy)
would range from 4.1% to 55.9% over 2010 - 2015, while the sales from US solar
manufacturers (REC Solar and SunPower) would decrease by around 1.6%. The
overall sales of solar panels in the MSA markets of my sample would increase by
34,848 kW, or 15.1% compared with the baseline scenario when the anti-dumping
policy is in place. Since the MSA markets selected in my sample account for 31%
of the total markets in the US, the simulated sales across the US would increase by
112,414 kW.
The simulation results in Table 28 show the social welfare change incurred for
different market participants and the environmental benefit brought by this policy
experiment. Over the period 2010 - 2015, for MSA markets in my sample, the net
gains for US consumers, US manufacturers, Chinese manufacturers and US installers
would be 35.68, -2.29, 40.64 and 37.85 million dollars, respectively. If I scale the
results to all MSA markets across the US, the net gains for US consumers, US
manufacturers, Chinese manufacturers and US installers would be 115.11, -7.39,
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131.09 and 122.09 million dollars, respectively.
By removing the anti-dumping duties and subsidy rates, the US solar market
would expand by 15.1%, and the increase in solar PV installations would result in
greater environmental benefit in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and
local air pollutants. The simulation results in Table 28 suggest that, the greenhouse
gas emissions would be reduced by around 0.77 million tons and the economic cost
of air pollution resulted from natural gas-fired generation would be reduced by
12.76 million dollars, together amounting to total environmental benefit of 26.36
million dollars. If I scale the results to all MSA markets across the US, the reduced
greenhouse gas emissions would reach 2.48 million tons and the total environmental
benefit would be worth 85.02 million dollars.
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Chapter 4: Welfare Effects Among Different Consumers
4.1 Consumer Demand for Solar Panels
To explore the incidence of trade restrictions on different types of consumers,
I use a random coefficient discrete choice model to further capture the heterogene-
ity in consumer tastes for differentiated solar panels. A product is defined as a
solar panel/installer combination, indexed by j. The conditional indirect utility of
household i in MSA w from purchasing and installing j during year t is given by
Uijwt = Xjβi + αipjwt + λmr + ηt + ζjt + εijt (4.1)
where Xj is a vector of nonprice product characteristics; βi is a vector of consumer-
specific marginal utilities (assumed random) associated with the different nonprice
product characteristics in Xjt; pjwt is the consumer purchase price for product j;
αi represents consumer-specific marginal disutility of price (also assumed random
across consumers); λmr is the solar manufacturer and installer fixed effect; ηt is the
year fixed effect; ζjt is the unobserved product characteristics; error εijt is i.i.d and
follows the type I extreme value distribution.
Following the discrete choice demand literature (Berry et al. (1995), Nevo
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(2000), Nevo (2001), Fan (2013) and Gayle (2013)), I model the consumer taste
parameters (αi and βi) for the solar panel characteristics given by
αi = α + ΠDw − σµi (4.2)
βi = β + Σvi (4.3)
Where Dw is a vector of demographic variables of MSA w where consumer i
resides in, Π is a matrix of coefficients that measure how the consumer tastes for
solar panel price vary with the demographic variables, σ is a scaling parameter; µi is
random draws from a lognormal distribution (i.e., ln(µi) ∼ N(0, 1)). The lognormal
distribution is useful in that it ensures the price coefficient to be negative across
consumers (Train, 2009); Σ is a diagonal scaling matrix, and vi is a random draw
from a multivariate standard normal distribution (i.e., vi ∼ N(0,1)). The predicted
market share of product j is given by





l=1 exp(δlwt + µilwt)
dF (ν) (4.4)
where δjwt = Xjtβ + αpjwt + (ΠDw)pjwt + λmr + ηt + ζjt is the mean utility across
consumers obtaining from purchasing and installing product j; µilwt is a consumer-
specific deviation from the mean utility level which associates with the consumer
tastes for different product characteristics. The parameters are estimated by using
simulation-assisted maximum likelihood (Train, 2009). I use 50 random draws from
the distribution function F (·) for the numerical approximation of sjwt(·).
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The market size is defined as the number of single family homes on the MSA
level which are suitable for installing solar PV systems. The observed market share
of product j is given by sjwt =
qjwt
Mw×V , where qjwt is the actual demand for product
j in MSA w during year t, Mw is the number of single family homes on the MSA
w, and V is the percentage of buildings which are solar-viable in that MSA area.
4.2 The Supply Side
On the supply side, firms have a marginal cost function that is linear in a vector
of cost characteristics. Assuming the solar manufacturer’s marginal cost depends on
a vector of variables Xt and the solar installer’s marginal cost depends on a vector
of variables Yt. Then the joint marginal cost is given by
mct = γ1Xt + γ2Yt + κ+ ψt (4.5)
where Xt includes labor cost, capital cost and technology input in solar panel
manufacturing; Yt includes labor cost in solar installation; κ is installer-year fixed
effect; and ψt is the proportion of marginal cost that is unobserved by the econo-
metrician, and I assume it to be a random term with zero mean. The labor cost
in manufacturing refers to the average hourly compensation cost in manufacturing
in the solar brand’s origin country; capital cost refers to the one-year lending in-
terest rate in the solar brand’s origin country and technology input refers to the
panel’s technology attribute (i.e., energy conversion efficiency), and labor cost in
installation refers to the wage rate for roofing in United States. As in Chapter 2,
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t = pt + (Tr ∗∆rt)−1st(p) + (Tm ∗∆mt)−1st(p) (4.6)
4.3 Data
The data I used mainly come from Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
(LBNL)s Tracking the Sun report series. Since I described this dataset in detail in
Chapter 2, I won’t repeat it here. The sources for other data used in this Chap-
ter are:(1) US Census Bureau, which provides MSA-level demographic distribution
regarding to the median income, education, median age, race, family structure, po-
litical orientation, as well as the number of single family homes; (2) US Bureau of
Labor Statistics, which provides hourly wage in manufacturing across different coun-
ties and hourly wage rate in roofing; (3) World Bank, which provides information
on the lending interest rates across different countries; (4) Google Project Sunroof,
which estimates the technical solar potential of all buildings in a region based on
sunlight, installation size and space, and reports the percentage of buildings that
are solar-viable.
In Table 29, I summarize the statistics for the demographics of the MSA
markets in my sample. The average of the median income across different MSAs is
$78,280, with a maximum at $130,520 and minimum at $50,320. For the education
level, I use the percent of population over 25 years old with bachelor degree or higher
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as a proxy. The average percent of people with bachelor degree or higher across
different MSAs is 30.23%, with a maximum at 48.7% and minimum at 13.0%. The
average of the median age across different MSAs is 38.78 years old, with a maximum
at 49.9 and minimum at 28.7 years old 1. For the composition of races, I use the
percent of white people alone (not Hispanic or Latino) as a proxy. The average
percent of white population across different MSAs is 68.89%, with a maximum at
94.25% and minimum at 35.3%. For the information on the family structure, I
use the percent of households with children under 18 years old as a proxy. The
average percent of households with children across different MSAs is 32.80%, with
a maximum at 42.4% and minimum at 22.2%. For the political orientation, I use
the percent of people voting for the Democratic candidate in the 2008 presidential
election as a proxy. The average percent of democratic supporters across different
MSAs is 54.67%, with a maximum at 74.90% and minimum at 33.46%.
4.4 Estimation Results
The demand and marginal cost parameters are estimated jointly by using Gen-
eralized Methods of Moments (GMM). The details on the estimation are provided
in Appendix C. Following the identification strategy used in Chapter 2, I use BLP
instruments as IVs, and the set of BLP instruments consist of three variables (i.e.,
BLP efficiency, BLP technology and BLP black).
Table 30 reports the results on both demand and marginal cost parameters
1The place with median age of 28.7 years old is State College Metropolitan Statistical Area in
the state of Pennsylvania, in which Pennsylvania State University is located.
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estimates. I begin with a discussion of the demand-side parameters. The upper
panel of demand side estimation reports the mean marginal utility for each product
characteristics (α and β), the panel immediately below this upper panel reports
the coefficients (σ and Σ) which measure the variation in taste for each product
characteristics, and the lower panel reports the coefficients (Π) on the interaction
of price with demographics.
As expected, the estimated price coefficient is negative and statistically signif-
icant at the 5% level. It suggests that, on average, the consumers are more likely to
choose a solar panel that has a lower price. The coefficient on “Efficiency” is posi-
tive and statistically significant, suggesting that consumers prefer solar panels with
higher energy conversion efficiency. With high-efficiency panels, the consumers can
obtain more solar energy with less amounts of solar panels. The coefficient on the
technology dummy is insignificant, but as expected and suggested by its negative
sign, consumers seem to regard panels made of polycrystalline cells as an inferior
substitute to panels made of monocrystalline cells. The estimated coefficient on the
black dummy is negative, suggesting that consumers prefer solar panels with silver
frames rather than those with black frames.
The estimated taste variation parameters for price, technology dummy and
black dummy are all statistically significant at the conventional significance levels,
confirming that consumers are heterogeneous for the price, technology type, and
frame color of the solar panels. More than half of the coefficients on the interaction
of price with demographics are statistically significant. The interpretation of the
estimates is straightforward. Consumers who reside in MSAs with higher median
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income and a higher proportion of democratic supporters tend to be less price sensi-
tive. This is consistent with the intuition that wealthier consumers are less sensitive
to the solar panel prices, and also democrats are more environmental friendly and
they are willing to pay higher prices to tackle with climate change. Consumers who
reside in MSAs with higher average levels of educational attainment, higher median
age, a higher proportion of white people, and a higher percentage of households with
children, are more price sensitive.
On the cost-side parameters, the coefficients on the manufacturing wage and
lending interest rate are positive and statistically significant at conventional levels of
significance, suggesting that the marginal cost increases with the labor and capital
cost in the manufacturing. The coefficient on “Efficiency” is statistically significant
at the 1% level, suggesting that marginal cost increases with technology input. The
positive and significant coefficient on the installing wage suggests that marginal cost
increases with the labor cost in the solar installations.
4.5 Policy Experiment
In this section, I explore the distribution of welfare change among different
groups of consumers. I revisit the six counterfactual simulations and investigate
which groups of consumers benefit or lose the most from the trade restrictions.
Following Small and Rosen (1981), I use the compensating variation to calcu-
late the change in consumer surplus. The formula (3.1) in Chapter 3 implies that
consumers who are price-insensitive may benefit more if they experience a positive
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consumer surplus change, and may lose more if they experience a negative consumer
surplus change.
Countries may respond by changing subsidy rates when facing dumping from
foreign firms. They may for example raise the subsidy rates on domestic firms,
therefore when conducting policy experiments I explicitly take the subsidy policy
into account together with the anti-dumping policy. I conduct six counterfactual
simulations based on different changes in anti-dumping duty and subsidy rates as
in Chapter 3. The procedures for computing and comparing the welfare changes
among different types of consumers are as follows: (i) I begin by drawing from the
estimated distribution of αi and βi in an MSA. I take a total of 50 draws, then
compute the consumer surplus for each one of these 50 “consumers”; (ii) Next, I
take the average consumer surplus for these 50 consumers and use it as the consumer
welfare for the MSA; (iii) I calculate the consumer welfare change (in percentage)
for that MSA between baseline and simulated scenarios; (iv) I repeat the above
procedures for each MSA and calculate the consumer welfare change for every MSA
in my sample; (v) Lastly, I plot graphs to show the distribution of consumer welfare
changes against the MSA’s demographics.
In simulated scenario I, I study the welfare change among different types of
consumers when removing the anti-dumping duties. The lift of the anti-dumping
policy will drive down the price of imported Chinese solar products and stimulate
their sales. Figure 6 shows the consumer welfare change among MSAs with different
demographics in the simulated scenario I. The red line is the line of best fit, and
its direction indicates the relationship between changes in consumer surplus and
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the MSA’s demographics. In general, the consumer surplus would increase resulted
from removing of the anti-dumping duties, which is consistent with my conclusion
in Chapter 3. Consumers who reside in MSAs with higher median income would
on average have higher percentage increase in consumer surplus. It suggests that
wealthier consumers would benefit more from the removing of the anti-dumping
duties. The same result holds for consumers who reside in MSAs with higher average
levels of educational attainment, higher median age, a higher proportion of white
people, and a higher proportion of democratic supporters. However, consumers who
reside in MSAs with a higher percentage of households with children would lose the
most in welfare.
One explanation for these results is that, price-insensitive consumers would
benefit more from removing of the anti-dumping policy, as indicated by the formula
(3.1). In Table 30, the coefficients on the interaction of price with demographics
(Π) suggest that consumers who reside in MSAs with higher median income, a
lower percentage of households with children, and a higher proportion of democratic
supporters, are less sensitive to the solar panel prices. Therefore, consumers of these
types would have higher percentage increase in consumer surplus. However, it can
not explain the outcome for the consumers who reside in MSAs with higher average
levels of educational attainment, higher median age, and a higher proportion of
white people.
In simulated scenario II, I evaluate the welfare change among different types of
consumers when China matches its subsidy rates on solar manufacturing with that
of US. Subsidy policy provides an alternative tool to anti-dumping issues. Figure 7
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shows the welfare change among different consumer groups in the simulated scenario
II. In general, the consumer surplus would increase, which is consistent with my
conclusion in Chapter 3. Consumers who reside in MSAs with higher median income
would on average have higher percentage increase in consumer surplus. It suggests
that high-income consumers would benefit more from the simulated policy. The
same result holds for consumers who reside in MSAs with higher average levels of
educational attainment, higher median age, a higher proportion of white people,
and a higher proportion of democratic supporters. However, consumer who reside
in MSAs with higher percentage of households with children would lose the most in
welfare.
In simulated scenario III, I explore the welfare change among different types of
consumers when US matches its subsidy rates on solar manufacturing with that of
China. The logic behind this counterfactual is that import country can respond by
increasing subsidy rates on domestic firms when facing dumping from foreign firms.
Figure 8 shows the welfare change among different consumer groups in the simulated
scenario III. Consumers who reside in MSAs with higher median income would on
average have higher percentage increase in consumer surplus. It suggests that high-
income consumers would generally benefit more from the simulated policy. The
same result holds for consumers who reside in MSAs with higher average levels of
educational attainment, a higher proportion of white people, and a higher proportion
of democratic supporters. However, consumers residing in MSAs with a higher
percentage of households with children would lose welfare from the simulated policy.
Figures 9, 10 and 11 show the results for the welfare change among different
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types of consumers in simulated scenario IV, V and VI, respectively, when one or
both of the countries set their subsidy rates to be zero. The results are quite similar,
and the conclusions are almost the same as what I have discussed in simulated
scenario I, II and III.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Discussion
5.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, I have examined how the trade war between China and the
US affects the social welfare in the fast-growing solar industry with vertical structure
between upstream and downstream firms. The solar sector is an important market
to study, because as one of the main sources of renewable energy it has the potential
to become a dominant energy source.
This dissertation first develops a two-country theoretical model in which the
home country imposes an anti-dumping duty on the imports from the foreign coun-
try, and examines how the quantities, prices and producer profits will change as
a response to the anti-dumping duties. Then I estimate a structural econometric
model of consumer demand for solar panels and marginal cost on solar manufactur-
ing which incorporates the vertical structure between upstream solar manufacturers
and downstream solar installers. Based on the estimated model, I conduct six coun-
terfactual simulations regarding to different hypothetical changes on anti-dumping
duties and subsidy rates. The results of my simulations show that the installation
capacity in the US solar market would expand by 36.4% if there were no anti-
dumping policies and welfare change for US consumers, US manufacturers, Chinese
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manufacturers and US installers would reach 272.77, -0.72, 303.77 and 298.37 million
dollars (in 2015 US dollars), respectively. Compared with the big losses in Chinese
solar manufacturers, the US manufacturers have only gained small profits from the
anti-dumping policy.
After studying the welfare change among different market participants, I pro-
ceed to explore the effect of the trade restrictions on different consumer groups. I
use a random coefficient discrete choice model to further capture the heterogeneity
in consumer tastes for solar panel prices. Through six counterfactual simulations
based on hypothetical changes in anti-dumping duty rates and subsidy rates, I find
that consumers who are relatively less sensitive to solar panel price (i.e., consumers
residing in areas with higher median income, a lower percentage of households with
children, and a higher proportion of democratic supporters) would benefit more if
there had been no anti-dumping policies.
I conclude by highlighting a few caveats of my paper. First, further work needs
to be done to model demand. My paper assumes that the demand system is static,
however, there still exists a possibility that a wait-or-buy decision may be involved
when the consumers choose to install a solar PV system. Thus future research would
benefit from making the demand side dynamic. Also, once the households have the
solar system installed, they are no longer in the market, so the demand system needs
to be modified to account for this feature. Second, my paper has not discussed the
effect of anti-dumping policies on US employment and manufactures. It would be
very interesting to consider what happens to US employment, as well as to US
manufactures when a trade war has been initiated. Has this trade war resulted in
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more job creation in the US solar manufacturing industry? Have the solar firms
invested more in their manufacturing capacity? Has the employment in the solar
installer industry changed as a result of the anti-dumping policy? Answering these
and other questions will help guide future research and inform trade policy, as well
as energy and environmental policies.
5.2 Discussion
In recent years, we have witnessed an increase protectionism policies despite
compelling economic arguments in favor of free trade and greater trade openness.
There are several motivations for governments in enacting the policies of retrain-
ing trade: 1) protect sunrise industries to keep them grow and become competitive
globally; 2) protect strategic industries such as water, energy and food; 3) limit un-
fair competition from foreign industry, such as dumping by undercutting domestic
prices; 4) protect local jobs and keep employment. However, some of the govern-
ment’s original intentions in implementing trade policy in favor of protectionism
may not be achieved. In my dissertation, the simulation result shows that the prof-
its for US solar manufacturers have only increased a little when the anti-dumping
policy is in place. In the next paragraph, I will discuss one similar case - the trade
friction in the automobile industry between the US and Japan in the 1990s.
In early 1990s, the US ran a high trade deficit (around $13 billion) with Japan
and the automobile and automobile parts industry accounted for a significantly
large portion of this. To remedy the bilateral trade deficit, the US considered to
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use the trade instruments via the automobile industry as a solution. In May 1995,
President Clinton announced 100 percent tariffs on thirteen luxury cars imported
from Japan, and these car models include five Lexus (Toyota) models, three Infiniti
(Nissan) models, two Acura (Honda) models, two Mazda models, and one Mitsubishi
model. However, the tariffs were withdrawn by United States only six weeks after
the announcement, because Japan agreed to buy substantially more US auto parts.
Levinsohn (1995) studied this topic and estimated what would have happened had
the tariffs been put permanently into place. What he had argued is very interesting.
He concluded that though Japanese profits in total would have fallen around 12.5
percent, US firms would have been pretty much unaffected by the tariffs, because
European firms would have captured many of the lost Japanese sales.
82
Figure 1: Top 10 states with solar power in 2016
Source: National Renewable Energy Laboratory; U.S. Department of
Energy; Tech Insider.
Figure 2: Monocrystalline and polycrystalline solar panels
Source: Alba Energy(albaenergy.com).
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Figure 3: Price decline of residential solar PV
Source: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.
Figure 4: Number of installations of residential solar systems over time
Source: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.
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Figure 5: Baseline price and simulated price
Note: Baseline price represents the simulated equilibrium price when the
anti-dumping policy is in place; simulated price represents the simulated
equilibrium price in the counterfactual scenarios.
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Figure 6: Consumer welfare change across different demographics for simulation I
Note: This figure shows the distribution of consumer welfare change
against the MSA’s demographics in counterfactual simulation I. Red line
is the line of best fit.
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Figure 7: Consumer welfare change across different demographics for simulation II
Note: This figure shows the distribution of consumer welfare change
against the MSA’s demographics in counterfactual simulation II. Red line
is the line of best fit.
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Figure 8: Consumer welfare change across different demographics for simulation III
Note: This figure shows the distribution of consumer welfare change
against the MSA’s demographics in counterfactual simulation III. Red
line is the line of best fit.
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Figure 9: Consumer welfare change across different demographics for simulation IV
Note: This figure shows the distribution of consumer welfare change
against the MSA’s demographics in counterfactual simulation IV. Red
line is the line of best fit.
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Figure 10: Consumer welfare change across different demographics for simulation V
Note: This figure shows the distribution of consumer welfare change
against the MSA’s demographics in counterfactual simulation V. Red line
is the line of best fit.
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Figure 11: Consumer welfare change across different demographics for simulation
VI
Note: This figure shows the distribution of consumer welfare change
against the MSA’s demographics in counterfactual simulation VI. Red
line is the line of best fit.
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Table 1: Top 15 manufacturers by market share
Rank 2011 Market Share 2015 Market Share
1 SunPower 17.18% REC Solar 16.68%
2 Suntech* 13.31% SunPower 12.90%
3 Kyocera Solar 10.83% Kyocera Solar 12.66%
4 Sharp 10.20% Trina Solar* 11.67%
5 Trina Solar* 7.11% SolarWorld 10.44%
6 Schuco USA 6.19% Canadian Solar* 7.85%
7 Canadian Solar* 4.62% LG Electronics 7.41%
8 SolarWorld 4.17% Hanwha Q CELLS 6.97%
9 REC Solar 4.03% Hyundai 3.75%
10 BP Solar 3.95% SunEdison 1.91%
11 Panasonic Group 2.28% AU Optronics 1.49%
12 ET Solar* 2.01% Suniva 1.32%
13 Schott Solar 1.42% Renesola* 0.98%
14 Yingli Green Energy* 1.26% Axitec 0.47%
15 Centrosolar 1.22% ET Solar* 0.35%
Notes: This table represents the top 15 manufacturers in US solar market by market share in
2011 and 2015, respectively. The firms with asterisk are Chinese solar makers.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics across years
Panel A 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
MSA 42 49 45 51 41 42
solar makers 4 6 6 7 7 8
solar panels 10 17 26 35 33 34
installation 1,087 1,612 4,214 6,469 12,821 17,340
Panel B
MSA 153 150 148 149 137 129
solar makers 109 138 145 161 150 158
solar panels 490 685 831 1,194 1,209 1,343
installation 33,584 41,958 58,598 102,828 151,455 239,490
Notes: This table represents the descriptive statistics for the key variables, including the
number of MSAs, the number of different solar makers, the number of different types of solar
panels and the number of solar PV installations. Panel A shows the statistics summary for the
inside goods and Panel B shows the statistics summary for the whole dataset.
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Table 3: List of models for the solar panels
Brand Model Brand Model











Yingli Green Energy YL235P-29b SPR-X21-335-BLK
YL250P-29b SPR-X21-345
Renesola JC250M-24/Bb Canadian Solar CS6P-230P
Hanwha Q CELLS Q.PRO BFR G4 265 CS6P-235PX





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: List of solar installers
Number Name Number Name
1 SolarCity 6 Sunpower
2 Vivint 7 REC Solar
3 Verengo 8 PetersenDean
4 Sungevity 9 RGS/Real Goods
5 Sunrun 10 All others
Notes: This table lists the ten groups of solar installers in US market. The first nine groups
are the nine biggest solar installers as marked by number 1 - 9 and the tenth group is all other

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Estimation result for main specification
Variables Estimates Standard Errors
Demand side parameters











Manufacturing Wage 0.050** (0.024)
Interest Rate 0.565** (0.287)
Efficiency 18.106*** (2.713)
Installing Wage 0.059*** (0.006)
Note: This table reports the result for the demand and supply estimation based on the mixed
logit specifications, in which I use BLP instruments as IVs. The sample is from year 2010 to
2015. On the demand side, Price is the after-subsidy average installed price for solar module
(in $/W); Efficiency represents the energy conversion efficiency; Technology represents the
type of solar photovoltaic technology, which is a dummy variable and equals to one if its made
of polycrystalline solar cells; Black is dummy variable, which equals to one if the solar module
has a black frame; Manufacturing Wage refers to the average hourly compensation cost in the
manufacturing in the solar brands origin country; Interest Rate refers to the one-year lending
interest rate in the solar brands origin country; Efficiency represents the energy conversion
efficiency; Installing Wage refers to the MSA-level wage rate ($/hour) for the roofing; Standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9: Result for robustness check I
Variables Estimates Standard Errors
Demand side parameters











Manufacturing Wage 0.054** (0.022)
Interest Rate 0.606** (0.267)
Efficiency 17.472*** (2.780)
Installing Wage 0.059*** (0.006)
Note: This table reports estimation result for the demand and supply models by using BLP
instruments and government subsidies as instrumental variables. The sample is from year 2010
to 2015. On the demand side, Price is the after-subsidy average installed price for solar module
(in $/W); Efficiency represents the energy conversion efficiency; Technology represents the type
of solar photovoltaic technology, which is a dummy variable and equals to one if its made of
polycrystalline solar cells; Black is dummy variable, which equals to one if the solar module
has a black frame; Manufacturing Wage refers to the average hourly compensation cost in the
manufacturing in the solar brands origin country; Interest Rate refers to the one-year lending
interest rate in the solar brands origin country; Efficiency represents the energy conversion
efficiency; Installing Wage refers to the MSA-level wage rate ($/hour) for the roofing; Standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10: Result for robustness check II
Variables Estimates Standard Errors
Demand side parameters











Manufacturing Wage 0.051** (0.025)
Interest Rate 0.576* (0.307
Efficiency 17.954*** (2.700)
Installing Wage 0.059*** (0.006)
Note: This table reports estimation result for the demand and supply models by using BLP
instruments and Hausman instrument as instrumental variables. The sample is from year 2010
to 2015. On the demand side, Price is the after-subsidy average installed price for solar module
(in $/W); Efficiency represents the energy conversion efficiency; Technology represents the type
of solar photovoltaic technology, which is a dummy variable and equals to one if its made of
polycrystalline solar cells; Black is dummy variable, which equals to one if the solar module
has a black frame; Manufacturing Wage refers to the average hourly compensation cost in the
manufacturing in the solar brands origin country; Interest Rate refers to the one-year lending
interest rate in the solar brands origin country; Efficiency represents the energy conversion
efficiency; Installing Wage refers to the MSA-level wage rate ($/hour) for the roofing; Standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 11: Price elasticity, marginal costs, and markups
Variable Mean Std.Dev 10% Median 90%
Price ($/W) 5.122 1.653 3.419 4.964 7.097
Own-price elasticity -4.199 1.468 - - -
Markup for solar manufacturer ($/W) 1.038 0.043 1.022 1.024 1.066
Markup for solar installer ($/W) 1.033 0.032 1.022 1.024 1.045
Joint marginal cost ($/W) 3.079 1.654 1.360 2.905 5.039
Note: This table reports means, standard deviations, as well as the 10th, 50th, and 90th
percentiles of price, own-price elasticity, markup for the solar manufacturer and solar installer,
and joint marginal cost.
















Notes: This table reports estimates of parameters in the supply side. The dependent variable
is the adjusted joint marginal cost. The independent variables Manufacturing Wage refers to
the average hourly compensation cost in the manufacturing in the solar brand’s origin country;
Interest Rate refers to the one-year lending interest rate in the solar brand’s origin country;
Efficiency represents the energy conversion efficiency; Installing Wage refers to the MSA-level






























































































































































































































































Table 14: Anti-dumping and countervailing duties (%)
Anti-dumping Countervailing
2012 2014 2012 2014
Suntech 31.73 52.13 14.78 27.64
Trina Solar 18.32 26.71 15.97 49.79
Canadian Solar 25.96 52.13 15.24 38.72
Yingli Green 25.96 52.13 15.24 38.72
Renesola - 78.42 - 38.72
Note: This table reports the anti-dumping and countervailing duties rates imposed on the
imported solar panels produced by Chinese manufacturers. Different Chinese manufacturers
may face different level of duties. The duty rates were first set by US Department of Commerce
in 2012, and then revised in 2014.
Table 15: Breakdown of total installed price over 2010 - 2015





2010 7.1 1.9 5.2 26.83%
2011 6.3 1.3 5.0 20.78%
2012 5.3 0.9 4.5 16.03%
2013 4.6 0.8 3.8 17.74%
2014 4.3 0.8 3.5 18.29%
2015 4.1 0.8 3.3 19.24%
Note: This table reports the trend of solar prices from 2010 to 2015. Total Price is the total
installed price ($/W), which is decomposed into module price and non-module cost. The data
for this table comes from Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.
Table 16: Assumptions of parameters in estimating environmental benefit
Parameter Value Sources
Number of years 25 Gillingham and Tsvetanov (2014)
Discount rate 3% Muller et al. (2011)
Full Sunlight hours 4 hours/day
CO2 emission rate 1.2 lbs/kWh Zivin et al. (2014)
External cost $ 0.021/kWh Gillingham and Tsvetanov (2014), Muller et al. (2011)
Social cost of carbon $37/tCO2 Inter-Agency Working Group (2013)
Note: Full sunlight hours represents the total amount of full sunlight hours per day. CO2
emission rate represents the average greenhouse gas emission from electricity generation across
all regions and hours of day in the US. External cost represents the total external cost of air
pollutants produced by natural gas-fired generation.
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Table 17: Demand response in simulation I







China Canadian Solar 39,626 82,134 42,508 107.3%
Renesola 456 599 143 31.5%
Suntech Power 5,945 7,297 1,352 22.7%
Trina Solar 42,412 75,536 33,124 78.1%
Yingli Green Energy 8,916 15,877 6,961 78.1%
USA SunPower 106,410 106,367 -42.3 -0.04%
REC Solar 25,527 25,430 -97 -0.4%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,040 1,039 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 230,330 314,281 83,951 36.4%
All markets 743,001 1,013,811 270,810 36.4%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario I, when
anti-dumping duty rates are set to zero and subsidy rates remain unchanged. The column
Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels when the anti-dumping policy is in
place.
Table 18: Welfare effect for simulation I
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 84.56 272.77
∆ US Manufacturers -0.22 -0.72
∆ China Manufacturers 94.17 303.77
∆ Installers 92.49 298.37
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission (tons) 1,853,851 5,980,164
∆Reduced External Cost ($ Million) 30.73 99.14
∆Total Environmental Benefit ($ Million) 63.49 204.82
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US installers
and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario I, when anti-dumping duty rates are set to
zero.
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Table 19: Demand response in simulation II







China Canadian Solar 39,626 62,880 23,253 58.7%
Renesola 456 480 25 5.5%
Suntech Power 5,945 6,614 670 11.3%
Trina Solar 42,411 54,317 11,905 28.1%
Yingli Green Energy 8,916 12,478 3,561 39.9%
USA SunPower 106,409 106,386 -23 -0.02%
REC Solar 25,527 25,489 -38 -0.1%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,040 1,039 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 230,330 269,685 39,355 17.1%
All markets 743,001 869,951 126,950 17.1%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario II,
when the anti-dumping duty rates are set to zero and China’s subsidy rates are set to be equal
to that of US. The column Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels when
the anti-dumping policy is in place.
Table 20: Welfare effect for simulation II
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 40.18 129.62
∆ US Manufacturers -0.09 -0.29
∆ China Manufacturers 43.39 139.96
∆ Installers 42.70 137.75
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission 869,050 2,803,387
∆Reduced External Cost 14.41 46.48
∆Total Environmental Benefit 29.76 96.01
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US installers
and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario II, when China’s subsidy rates are set to be
equal to that of US.
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Table 21: Demand response in simulation III







China Canadian Solar 39,626 82,116 42,490 62.0%
Renesola 456 599 143 31.5%
Suntech Power 5,945 7,293 1,349 22.7%
Trina Solar 42,412 75,481 33,069 78.0%
Yingli Green Energy 8,916 15,876 6,960 78.1%
USA SunPower 106,410 128,713 22,303 21.0%
REC Solar 25,527 29,734 4,207 16.5%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,040 1,039 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 230,330 340,851 110,522 48.0%
All markets 743,001 1,099,523 356,521 48.0%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario III,
when the anti-dumping duty rates are set to zero and US subsidy rates are set to be equal to
that of China. The column Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels when
the anti-dumping policy is in place.
Table 22: Welfare effect for simulation III
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 109.47 353.13
∆ US Manufacturers 29.00 93.55
∆ China Manufacturers 94.07 303.45
∆ Installers 120.91 390.02
∆ US Subsidies 67.73 218.47
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission 2,440,593 7,872,880
∆Reduced External Cost 40.46 130.52
∆Total Environmental Benefit 83.59 269.64
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US in-
stallers and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario III, when US subsidy rates on solar
manufacturing are set to be equal to that of China.
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Table 23: Demand response for simulation IV







China Canadian Solar 39,626 61,765 22,139 55.9%
Renesola 456 474 19 4.1%
Suntech Power 5,945 6,506 561 9.4%
Trina Solar 42,412 53,321 10,909 25.7%
Yingli Green Energy 8,916 12,214 3,299 37.0%
USA SunPower 106,410 106,388 -22 -0.02%
REC Solar 25,527 25,492 -35 -0.1%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,040 1,039 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 230,330 267,200 36,869 16.0%
All markets 743,001 861,934 118,933 16.0%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario IV,
when the anti-dumping duty and China’s subsidy rates are set to zero, while US subsidy rates
remain unchanged. The column Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels
when the anti-dumping policy is in place.
Table 24: Welfare effect for simulation IV
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 37.58 121.23
∆ US Manufacturers -0.08 -0.27
∆ China Manufacturers 40.63 131.07
∆ Installers 39.99 129.01
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission 814,165 2,626,338
∆Reduced External Cost 13.50 43.54
∆Total Environmental Benefit 27.89 89.95
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US installers
and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario IV, when the anti-dumping duties and China’s
subsidy rates are set to zero, while US subsidy rates remain unchanged.
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Table 25: Demand response for simulation V







China Canadian Solar 39,626 82,136 42,510 107.3%
Renesola 456 599 143 31.5%
Suntech Power 5,945 7,297 1,352 22.7%
Trina Solar 42,412 75,540 33,129 78.1%
Yingli Green Energy 8,916 15,876 6,960 78.1%
USA SunPower 106,409 104,674 -1,735 -1.6%
REC Solar 25,527 25,097 -430 -1.7%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,040 1,039 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 230,330 312,262 81,931 35.6%
All markets 743,001 1,007,295 264,294 35.6%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario V,
when the anti-dumping duty and US subsidy rates are set to zero, while China’s subsidy rates
remain unchanged. The column Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels
when the anti-dumping policy is in place.
Table 26: Welfare effect for simulation V
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 82.66 266.65
∆ US Manufacturers -2.43 -7.84
∆ China Manufacturers 94.18 303.79
∆ Installers 90.34 291.42
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission 1,809,245 5,836,272
∆Reduced External Cost 29.99 96.75
∆Total Environmental Benefit 61.97 199.89
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US installers
and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario V, when the anti-dumping duties and US
subsidy rates are set to zero, while China’s subsidy rates remain unchanged.
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Table 27: Demand response in simulation VI







China Canadian Solar 39,626 61,766 22,140 55.9%
Renesola 456 474 18 4.1%
Suntech Power 5,944 6,506 562 9.4%
Trina Solar 42,412 53,324 10,912 25.7%
Yingli Green Energy 8,916 12,214 3,298 37.0%
USA SunPower 106,409 104,694 -1,715 -1.6%
REC Solar 25,527 25,159 -368 -1.4%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,040 1,039 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 230,330 265,179 34,848 15.1%
All markets 743,001 855,415 112,414 15.1%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario VI,
when the anti-dumping duty, China and US subsidy rates are all set to zero. The column
Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels when the anti-dumping policy is in
place.
Table 28: Welfare effect for simulation VI
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 35.68 115.11
∆ US Manufacturers -2.29 -7.39
∆ China Manufacturers 40.64 131.09
∆ Installers 37.85 122.09
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission 769,538 2,482,382
∆Reduced External Cost 12.76 41.15
∆Total Environmental Benefit 26.36 85.02
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US installers
and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario VI, when the anti-dumping duties, China and
US subsidy rates are all set to zero.
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Table 29: Summary statistics for the demographics
Demographics Mean Median Max Min
Income ($000) 78.28 79.31 130.52 50.32
Education (%) 30.23 30.80 48.70 13.00
Age 38.78 38.91 49.90 28.70
Race (%) 68.89 72.16 94.25 35.30
Child (%) 32.80 33.15 42.40 22.20
Political Orientation (%) 54.67 58.08 74.90 33.46
Note: This table reports the summary statistics for the demographic variables on the MSA
level. Income represents the median family income (in $1000); Education represents the per-
cent of population over 25 with bachelors degree or higher; Age represents the median age of
the population; Race represents the percent of white people (not Hispanic or Latino); Child
represents the percent of households with children under 18 years; Political Orientation rep-
resents the percent of people voting for the Democratic candidate in the 2008 presidential
election.
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Table 30: Estimation result
Variables Estimates Standard Errors
Demand side parameters















Political Orientation 0.030 (0.055)
Cost side parameters
Constant -4.047** (1.743)
Manufacturing Wage 0.054** (0.023)
Interest Rate 0.523* (0.279)
Efficiency 10.615*** (2.964)
Installing Wage 0.048*** (0.007)
Note: This table reports the result for the demand and supply estimation based on the random
coefficients specification. The sample is from year 2010 to 2015. On the demand side, Price is
the after-subsidy average installed price for solar module (in $/W); Efficiency represents the
energy conversion efficiency; Technology represents the type of solar photovoltaic technology,
which is a dummy variable and equals to one if its made of polycrystalline solar cells; Black is
dummy variable, which equals to one if the solar module has a black frame; Income represents
the median family income; Education is a dummy variable if the individual has a bachelor
degree or higher; Age represents median age; Race is a dummy variable if the consumer is white
people (not Hispanic or Latino); Child is a dummy variable if the individual has children under
18 years old; Political Orientation is a dummy variable if the consumer voted for Democratic
candidate in 2008 presidential election. On the cost side, Manufacturing Wage refers to the
average hourly compensation cost in the manufacturing in the solar brands origin country;
Interest Rate refers to the one-year lending interest rate in the solar brands origin country,
Efficiency represents the energy conversion efficiency; installing wage refers to the MSA-level
wage rate ($/hour) for the roofing; Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Appendix A: DERIVATION of ∆mt
The derivation for ∆mt is identical to that in Berto Villas-Boas (2007) and I
outline the key steps below.
Note that ∆mt = ∆
′
pt∆rt, where ∆rt is the solar installer’s response matrix
with ∆rt(k, j) =
∂sjt
∂pkt





∆rt can be easily computed. To obtain ∆mt, the only additional computation
needed is ∆pt, which represents a matrix of derivatives of all the final prices with




Following Villas-Boas (2007), the first order condition for the downstream solar








I suppress the market index t to avoid a clutter of subscripts. Totally differ-













































. Since (pk − pmk − crk) can be computed directly from
the equation (2.6), the calculation of matrix G is not involved with the upstream
price and the marginal cost. Let Hn be a J-dimensional column vector with element
h(j, n) = Ψr(n, j)
∂sn
∂pj
. Then equation (A.2) is rewritten as
Gdp−Hndpmn = 0 (A.3)
Finally, the response matrix ∆p can be calculated with the matrix G and Hn
through the following expression
∆pt = G
−1Hn (A.4)
With ∆pt computed, ∆mt will be obtained, so are the parameters on the supply
model.
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Appendix B: Standard Logit Model
A standard logit specification of the demand model is as follows. The con-
ditional indirect utility of consumer i in MSA w from purchasing and installing j
during year t is given by
Uijwt = Xjtβ + αpjwt +Dwtψ + λmr + ηt + ζjt + εijt (B.1)
where Xjt is the characteristics of solar panels; pjwt is the consumer purchase price;
Dwt is MSA-level demographic and geographic variables, which include levels of
educational attainment, median income, median age and electricity price; ζjt is
the product characteristics unobserved by the econometrician but observed by the
consumers and firms; Error term εijt is i.i.d and follows the type I extreme value
distribution; λmr is solar manufacturer and solar installer fixed effect; ηt is the year
fixed effect.
The trans-log version of the predicted market share of solar panel/installer
pair j in MSA w during year t is given by
ln sjwt − ln s0wt = Xjtβ + αpjwt +Dwtψ + λmr + ηt + ζjt (B.2)
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where sjwt is the market share of the inside goods and s0wt is the market share of
the outside goods.
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Appendix C: GMM Estimation









where η is a vector of demand residuals (ζ) and supply residuals (ψ); W is a block
diagonal matrix of instruments for the demand and supply equations; Φ−1 is a
weighting matrix; γ is the coefficients on the supply equation; σ is taste variation
parameter for the price and Σ are taste variation parameters for the nonprice char-
acteristics. For given values of the mean utilities δ, optimal value for the linear































where X1 is a matrix of regressors in the demand model (pjt and xjt), Wd is a
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matrix of demand instruments, Q is the matrix of cost shifters in the supply equa-
tion, Y is the markup on the supply side and Ws is a matrix of supply instruments.
For a given guess of parameters σ0 and Σ0, the vector of the mean utilities δ0 can
be recovered by using the contraction mapping method (Berry (1994), Berry et al.
(1995) and Nevo (2000)).
δh+1.t = δ
h
.t + lnS.t − ln Ŝ.t(δ.t, σ,Σ) (C.4)
where S.t is the observed market share and Ŝ.t is the predicted market share.
I solve for the mean utilities δ0 that set the predicted market shares equal to the
observed market shares. With δ0 solved, I can recover the associated values of α0
and β0 by using equation (C.2), and compute the corresponding vector for product









Once the optimal taste parameters σ̂ and Σ̂ are found, the associated param-
eters α̂ and β̂ can be recovered.
117
Appendix D: Alternative Simulation Results
Table D1 - Table D12 report the simulation results based on parameters esti-
mated by the structural model which uses BLP instruments and government subsides
as IVs. Table D13 - Table D24 report the simulation results based on parameters
estimated by the structural model which uses BLP instruments and Hausman in-
strument as IVs.
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Table D1: Demand response in simulation I







China Canadian Solar 52,000 82,790 29,790 57.3%
Renesola 487 596 109 22.3%
Suntech Power 6,381 7,290 910 14.3%
Trina Solar 53,100 75,560 22,461 42.3%
Yingli Green Energy 10,893 15,815 4,921 45.2%
USA SunPower 106,655 106,425 -230 -0.2%
REC Solar 25,502 25,421 -81 -0.3%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,042 1,041 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 256,060 313,941 57,881 22.6%
All markets 826,001 1,012,712 186,712 22.6%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario I, when
anti-dumping duty rates are set to zero and subsidy rates remain unchanged. The column
Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels when the anti-dumping policy is in
place.
Table D2: Welfare effect for simulation I
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 91.07 293.79
∆ US Manufacturers -0.67 -2.15
∆ China Manufacturers 107.43 346.56
∆ Installers 105.63 340.76
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission (tons) 1,278,148 4,123,057
∆Reduced External Cost ($ Million) 21.19 68.35
∆Total Environmental Benefit ($ Million) 43.78 141.21
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US installers
and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario I, when anti-dumping duty rates are set to
zero.
119
Table D3: Demand response in simulation II







China Canadian Solar 52,000 69,378 17,378 33.4%
Renesola 488 518 30 6.2%
Suntech Power 6,381 6,850 470 7.4%
Trina Solar 53,100 61,729 8,629 16.3%
Yingli Green Energy 10,893 13,587 2,694 24.7%
USA SunPower 106,655 106,533 -121 -0.1%
REC Solar 25,502 25,467 -35 -0.1%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,042 1,041 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 256,060 285,105 29,045 11.3%
All markets 826,001 919,693 93,692 11.3%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario II,
when the anti-dumping duty rates are set to be zero and China’s subsidy rates are set to be
equal to that of US. The column Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels
when the anti-dumping policy is in place.
Table D4: Welfare effect for simulation II
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 46.26 149.22
∆ US Manufacturers -0.32 -1.02
∆ China Manufacturers 53.04 171.09
∆ Installers 52.16 168.25
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission 641,375 2,068,952
∆Reduced External Cost 10.63 34.30
∆Total Environmental Benefit 21.97 70.86
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US installers
and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario II, when China’s subsidy rates are set to be
equal to that of US.
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Table D5: Demand response in simulation III







China Canadian Solar 52,000 81,744 29,744 57.2%
Renesola 488 596 109 22.3%
Suntech Power 6,381 7,281 901 14.1%
Trina Solar 53,100 75,502 22,402 42.2%
Yingli Green Energy 10,893 15,814 4,921 45.2%
USA SunPower 106,655 119,738 13,083 12.3%
REC Solar 25,502 27,937 2,434 9.5%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,042 1,041 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 256,060 329,655 73,594 28.7%
All markets 826,000 1,063,401 237,401 28.7%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario III,
when the anti-dumping duty rates are set to zero and US subsidy rates are set to be equal to
that of China. The column Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels when
the anti-dumping policy is in place.
Table D6: Welfare effect for simulation III
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 114.02 367.82
∆ US Manufacturers 27.98 90.26
∆ China Manufacturers 107.22 345.86
∆ Installers 133.03 429.11
∆ US Subsidies 62.74 202.39
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission 1,625,147 5,242,409
∆Reduced External Cost 26.94 86.91
∆Total Environmental Benefit 55.66 179.55
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US in-
stallers and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario III, when US subsidy rates on solar
manufacturing are set to be equal to that of China.
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Table D7: Demand response for simulation IV







China Canadian Solar 52,000 68,620 16,620 32.0%
Renesola 488 513 26 5.3%
Suntech Power 6,381 6,779 398 6.2%
Trina Solar 53,100 61,037 7,937 14.9%
Yingli Green Energy 10,893 13,407 2,514 23.1%
USA SunPower 106,655 106,539 -115 -0.1%
REC Solar 25,502 25,469 -33 -0.1%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,042 1,041 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 256,060 283,406 27,345 10.7%
All markets 826,001 914,213 88,212 10.7%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario IV,
when the anti-dumping duty and China’s subsidy rates are set to zero, while US subsidy rates
remain unchanged. The column Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels
when the anti-dumping policy is in place.
Table D8: Welfare effect for simulation IV
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 43.49 140.28
∆ US Manufacturers -0.30 -0.96
∆ China Manufacturers 49.93 161.06
∆ Installers 49.11 158.40
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission 603,866 1,947,953
∆Reduced External Cost 10.01 32.29
∆Total Environmental Benefit 20.68 66.72
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US installers
and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario IV, when the anti-dumping duties and China’s
subsidy rates are set to zero, while US subsidy rates remain unchanged.
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Table D9: Demand response for simulation V







China Canadian Solar 52,000 81.794 29,794 57.3%
Renesola 487 596 108 22.3%
Suntech Power 6,380 7,291 910 14.3%
Trina Solar 53,100 75,566 22,465 42.3%
Yingli Green Energy 10,893 15,815 4,922 45.2%
USA SunPower 106,655 105,374 -1,281 -1.2%
REC Solar 25,502 25,220 -282 -1.1%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,042 1,041 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 256,060 312,698 56,638 22.1%
All markets 826,000 1,008,702 182,702 22.1%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario V,
when the anti-dumping duty and US subsidy rates are set to zero, while China’s subsidy rates
remain unchanged. The column Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels
when the anti-dumping policy is in place.
Table D10: Welfare effect for simulation V
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 89.26 287.93
∆ US Manufacturers -2.92 -9.41
∆ China Manufacturers 107.45 346.61
∆ Installers 103.48 333.79
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission 1,250,699 4,034,512
∆Reduced External Cost 20.73 66.88
∆Total Environmental Benefit 42.84 138.18
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US installers
and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario V, when the anti-dumping duties and US
subsidy rates are set to zero, while China’s subsidy rates remain unchanged.
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Table D11: Demand response in simulation VI







China Canadian Solar 52,000 68,623 16,623 32.0%
Renesola 488 513 26 5.3%
Suntech Power 6,381 6,779 399 6.2%
Trina Solar 53,100 61,041 7,941 15.0%
Yingli Green Energy 10,893 13,407 2,514 23.1%
USA SunPower 106,655 105,488 -1,167 -1.1%
REC Solar 25,502 25,268 -234 -0.9%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,042 1,041 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 256,060 282,162 26,101 10.2%
All markets 826,000 910,200 84,200 10.2%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario VI,
when the anti-dumping duty, China and US subsidy rates are all set to zero. The column
Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels when the anti-dumping policy is in
place.
Table D12: Welfare effect for simulation VI
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 41.66 134.40
∆ US Manufacturers -2.55 -8.23
∆ China Manufacturers 49.94 161.11
∆ Installers 46.96 161.11
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission 576,396 1,859,342
∆Reduced External Cost 9.56 30.82
∆Total Environmental Benefit 19.74 63.68
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US installers
and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario VI, when the anti-dumping duties, China and
US subsidy rates are all set to zero.
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Table D13: Demand response in simulation I







China Canadian Solar 45,760 81,661 35,901 78.5%
Renesola 472 597 125 26.6%
Suntech Power 6,176 7,286 1,110 18.0%
Trina Solar 47,593 75,229 27,636 58.1%
Yingli Green Energy 9,923 15,805 5,882 59.3%
USA SunPower 106,264 106,231 -33 -0.03%
REC Solar 25,453 25,370 -82 -0.3%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,040 1,039 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 242,679 313,219 70,539 29.1%
All markets 782,836 1,010,382 227,545 29.1%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario I, when
anti-dumping duty rates are set to zero and subsidy rates remain unchanged. The column
Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels when the anti-dumping policy is in
place.
Table D14: Welfare effect for simulation I
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 89.61 289.08
∆ US Manufacturers -0.24 -0.76
∆ China Manufacturers 100.35 323.70
∆ Installers 98.39 317.37
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission (tons) 1,557,675 5,024,759
∆Reduced External Cost ($ Million) 25.82 83.30
∆Total Environmental Benefit ($ Million) 53.35 172.10
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US installers
and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario I, when anti-dumping duty rates are set to
zero.
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Table D15: Demand response in simulation II







China Canadian Solar 45,760 66,104 20,344 44.5%
Renesola 472 501 29 6.2%
Suntech Power 6,176 6,740 564 9.1%
Trina Solar 47,593 57,906 10,313 21.7%
Yingli Green Energy 9,923 13,049 3,126 31.5%
USA SunPower 106,264 106,245 -19 -0.02%
REC Solar 25,453 25,419 -33 -0.1%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,040 1,039 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 242,679 277,003 34,324 14.1%
All markets 782,837 893,560 110,723 14.1%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario II,
when the anti-dumping duty rates are set to be zero and China’s subsidy rates are set to be
equal to that of US. The column Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels
when the anti-dumping policy is in place.
Table D16: Welfare effect for simulation II
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 44.12 142.31
∆ US Manufacturers -0.10 -0.31
∆ China Manufacturers 48.13 155.26
∆ Installers 47.25 152.43
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission 757,965 2,445,048
∆Reduced External Cost 12.57 40.53
∆Total Environmental Benefit 25.96 83.74
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US installers
and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario II, when China’s subsidy rates are set to be
equal to that of US.
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Table D17: Demand response in simulation III







China Canadian Solar 45,760 81,646 35,886 78.4%
Renesola 472 597 125 26.6%
Suntech Power 6,176 7,283 1,107 17.9%
Trina Solar 47,593 75,185 27,592 58.0%
Yingli Green Energy 9,923 15,804 5,882 59.3%
USA SunPower 106,264 123,562 17,298 16.3%
REC Solar 25,453 28,720 3,267 12.8%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1040 1039 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 242,679 333,838 91,159 37.6%
All markets 782,837 1,076,897 294,060 37.6%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario III,
when the anti-dumping duty rates are set to zero and US subsidy rates are set to be equal to
that of China. The column Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels when
the anti-dumping policy is in place.
Table D18: Welfare effect for simulation III
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 113.99 367.72
∆ US Manufacturers 28.34 91.41
∆ China Manufacturers 100.25 323.388
∆ Installers 126.16 406.98
∆ US Subsidies 64.83 209.13
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission 2,013,009 6,493,578
∆Reduced External Cost 33.37 107.65
∆Total Environmental Benefit 68.94 222.40
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US in-
stallers and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario III, when US subsidy rates on solar
manufacturing are set to be equal to that of China.
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Table D19: Demand response for simulation IV







China Canadian Solar 45,760 65,177 19,417 42.4%
Renesola 472 496 24 5.1%
Suntech Power 6,176 6,652 475 7.7%
Trina Solar 47,593 57,064 9,471 19.9%
Yingli Green Energy 9,923 12,831 2,908 29.3%
USA SunPower 106,264 106,246 -18 -0.02%
REC Solar 25,453 25,421 -31 -0.1%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,040 1,039 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 242,679 274,927 32,247 13.3%
All markets 782,837 886,860 104,023 13.3%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario IV,
when the anti-dumping duty and China’s subsidy rates are set to zero, while US subsidy rates
remain unchanged. The column Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels
when the anti-dumping policy is in place.
Table D20: Welfare effect for simulation IV
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 41.38 133.48
∆ US Manufacturers -0.09 -0.29
∆ China Manufacturers 45.21 145.84
∆ Installers 44.39 143.18
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission 712,096 2,297,084
∆Reduced External Cost 11.81 38.08
∆Total Environmental Benefit 24.39 78.67
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US installers
and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario IV, when the anti-dumping duties and China’s
subsidy rates are set to zero, while US subsidy rates remain unchanged.
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Table D21: Demand response for simulation V







China Canadian Solar 45,760 81,661 35,901 78.5%
Renesola 472 597 125 26.6%
Suntech Power 6,176 7,287 1,111 18.0%
Trina Solar 47,593 75,232 27,639 58.1%
Yingli Green Energy 9,923 15,805 5,882 59.3%
USA SunPower 106,264 104,888 -1,376 -1.3%
REC Solar 25,453 25,107 -346 -1.4%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,040 1,039 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 242,679 311,616 68,937 28.4%
All markets 782836 1,005,214 222,378 28.4%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario V,
when the anti-dumping duty and US subsidy rates are set to zero, while China’s subsidy rates
remain unchanged. The column Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels
when the anti-dumping policy is in place.
Table D22: Welfare effect for simulation V
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 87.72 282.97
∆ US Manufacturers -2.44 -7.88
∆ China Manufacturers 100.36 323.73
∆ Installers 96.23 310.43
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission 1,522,303 4,910,657
∆Reduced External Cost 25.24 81.41
∆Total Environmental Benefit 52.14 168.19
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US installers
and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario V, when the anti-dumping duties and US
subsidy rates are set to zero, while China’s subsidy rates remain unchanged.
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Table D23: Demand response in simulation VI







China Canadian Solar 45,760 65,178 19,418 42.4%
Renesola 472 496 23 5.1%
Suntech Power 6,176 6,652 476 7.7%
Trina Solar 47,593 57,067 9,474 19.9%
Yingli Green Energy 9,923 12,831 2,908 29.3%
USA SunPower 106,264 104,903 -1,361 -1.3%
REC Solar 25,453 25,158 -294 -1.2%
South Korea Hanwha Q CELLS 1,040 1,039 -1 -0.1%
Subtotal 242,679 273,324 30,645 12.6%
All markets 782,837 881,691 98,854 12.6%
Note: This table reports the demand change for the counterfactual simulation scenario VI,
when the anti-dumping duty, China and US subsidy rates are all set to zero. The column
Baseline represents the simulated demand for solar panels when the anti-dumping policy is in
place.
Table D24: Welfare effect for simulation VI
Items MSA markets in my sample All MSA markets
A. Welfare (2015$ Million)
∆ CS 39.48 127.37
∆ US Manufacturers -2.30 -7.42
∆ China Manufacturers 45.22 145.86
∆ Installers 42.24 136.26
B. Environmental Benefit
∆Reduced CO2 Emission 676,715 2,182,952
∆Reduced External Cost 11.22 36.19
∆Total Environmental Benefit 23.18 74.77
Note: This table reports the welfare changes for US consumer, US manufacturers, US installers
and Chinese manufacturers in simulated scenario VI, when the anti-dumping duties, China and
US subsidy rates are all set to zero.
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